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This paper studies the relation of systematic pension risk 
(pension beta) and corporate investment in a large sample of 
U.S. firms. We present evidence of a negative impact of 
pension risk on investment, which is consistent with the view 
that firms forego valuable investment opportunities because 
they fail to notice that systematic pension risk causes an 
upward bias in the discount rates they use in capital 
budgeting decisions. The pension risk bias in investment is 
economically relevant and not limited to financially 
constrained firms. The study can be generalized to all firms 
that base their investment decisions on a firm-wide discount 
rate without noticing the different sources of systematic risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The bad news is that standard cost of capital calculations used in corporate finance, 
which do not distinguish between the operating asset risk and pension plan risk, can greatly 
overestimate the discount rate for net present value analysis of operating projects. […] In 
such cases, capital projects with positive net present value could be rejected by management. 
– Jin, Merton, and Bodie, Journal of Financial Economics, 2006 – 
 
This paper presents empirical evidence for the distortion of corporate investment 
induced by inappropriate factoring in of the risk of defined benefit pension plans. According 
to the standard textbook formula, the value of an operating project depends on both its 
expected cash flows and its risk, which is reflected in the project’s discount rate (Krüger, 
Landier, and Thesmar (2015)). Most firms do not estimate this rate for each project separately 
but use the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as a single, firm-wide discount rate 
instead (Bierman (1993) and Graham and Harvey (2001)). According to Jin, Merton, and 
Bodie (2006), the WACC of firms that sponsor defined benefit (DB) plans is a biased estimate 
of the discount rate for net present value (NPV) analyses of operating projects. By 
discounting operating cash flows at the WACC, firms effectively assign their total risk to their 
business operations, although part of that risk actually comes from the pension assets and 
liabilities (Merton (2006)). Moreover, the standard calculation of the WACC understates the 
firm’s leverage ratio because it does not take into account the pension liabilities, which are 
off-balance sheet items (Merton (2006)). The cumulative effect of these distortions is that the 
WACC generally overestimates the discount rate for operating projects, which could induce 
firms to forgo valuable investment opportunities (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) and Merton 
(2006)). 
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DB pension plans are the largest off-balance sheet risk of corporate America 
(Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). Despite the recent trend to freeze DB plans, the 
aggregate value of corporate (DB) pension liabilities reached an all-time high of USD 3.1 
trillion in 2012 (Investment Company Institute (2014)). The distortion of corporate 
investment by pension risk could hence be substantial. 
For the years 2003 to 2012 our analysis covers 1,562 U.S. COMPUSTAT firms that 
sponsor a DB pension plan. Our empirical strategy relies on a regression analysis with firm 
and year fixed effects. We measure corporate investment by capital expenditures (net of 
depreciation) and estimate the pension risk bias in the discount rate as suggested by Jin, 
Merton, and Bodie (2006). We predict that investment is decreasing in systematic pension 
risk because the discount rate (WACC) increases with pension beta, which reduces the 
number of positive NPV projects that the firm effectively invests in. Our empirical evidence 
supports this prediction. The distortion of corporate investment because of pension plan risk is 
economically large, robust to different empirical specifications, and emerges independently of 
plan freezes and financial distress of the plan sponsoring firm. On average, pension firms 
forgo valuable investment opportunities.  
Our findings are consistent with Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015), who show that 
firms underinvest in low risk divisions and overinvest in high risk divisions because they use 
a single discount rate that overestimates the systematic risk of low risk segments, while it 
underestimates the systematic risk of high risk segments.  
Our results could reflect the financing constraints of the sponsoring firm. Rauh (2006) 
shows that investment of financially constrained firms declines with mandatory pension 
contributions, which are payments to the pension plan that cannot be altered or postponed. 
Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012) explain Rauh’s finding with the effect of 
mandatory contributions on the WACC of financially constrained firms. Since our data do not 
allow us to control for mandatory pension contributions, the negative relation we observe 
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between pension risk and investment activities could also be caused by the correlation of 
pension risk with these contributions. We address this concern by separately estimating the 
sensitivity of investment to pension risk for financially constrained as well as financially 
unconstrained firms. If our results were explained by unobserved mandatory contributions, 
pension risk should only affect the investment of financially constrained firms. Contrary to 
that, however, we find that pension risk affects corporate investment regardless of financing 
constraints. This indicates that the distortion of investment by pension risk is not driven by the 
presence of mandatory contributions. 
A further endogeneity concern is the potential correlation between pension risk and 
unobserved investment opportunities. Firms with larger pension plans and higher systematic 
pension risk are typically older than firms with smaller pension obligations. Older firms might 
have fewer investment opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2015)). The correlation of 
an explanatory variable of investment with unobserved investment opportunities is well-
known in the literature (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Kaplan and Zingales (2000), 
Erickson and Whited (2000), and Rauh (2006)). To address this concern we match each firm 
with a DB plan in our sample to a firm without such a plan. The systematic pension risk is 
naturally zero for firms that do not sponsor DB pension plans (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)) 
and therefore uncorrelated with investment opportunities. The results of this matched-sample 
analysis are consistent with our previous findings, which is inconsistent with the claim that 
the pension risk sensitivity of investment we observed is the consequence of a correlation of 
pension risk with unobserved investment opportunities. 
The last section of the paper examines whether nonpension firms seize the investment 
opportunities that firms with DB pension plans forgo. Rauh (2006) finds that forgone 
investment by financially constrained firms is undertaken by firms that are not financially 
constrained. We test this prediction by regressing capital expenditures (net of depreciation) of 
nonpension firms on the aggregate pension risk of pension firms in the same Fama French 48 
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industry. We find that the investment of nonpension firms is indeed positively related to 
industry pension risk. 
We contribute to the investment literature by showing that corporate investment is 
distorted by the risk of an important nonoperating activity of listed firms in the U.S. We show 
that this distortion is consistent with the effect of pension risk on the standard estimate of 
project discount rates (WACC), as described by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006). Moreover, we 
show that pension risk distorts corporate investment on top of the distortion from mandatory 
contributions, as identified by Rauh (2006). Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015) find that 
using the WACC as a single discount rate distorts the within firm allocation of resources. We 
extend their work by showing that discounting with the WACC distorts the resource 
allocation between firms as well. Hence, we believe that the relevance of this paper goes 
beyond pension economics. Our findings apply to all firms that base their investment 
decisions on a single discount rate without taking into account the different sources of 
systematic risk. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background of the paper. Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection. Section 4 
presents our empirical method and the main variables. Section 5 shows the empirical results 
and their discussion. Last, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
There is a substantial strand of literature that studies whether the values of DB pension 
assets and liabilities are reflected in the market value of the sponsoring firms. Representative 
studies concerning the firm’s equity value include Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and Seligman 
(1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), and Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987). Carroll and 
Niehaus (1998) present similar evidence with respect to the debt market. Jin, Merton, and 
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Bodie (2006) extend this literature by showing that capital markets also account for the 
systematic risk of pension assets and liabilities. They show formally as well as empirically 
that a firm’s systematic capital risk (βD+E) is related to the firm’s systematic pension risk 
(PR).1  
 
βD+E = βOA
OA
D+E
+ PR , (1) 
 
where βOA is the systematic risk of operating assets (OA), E is the market value of 
equity, and D is the market value of debt. The systematic pension risk is the value weighted 
difference between the systematic risk of pension assets (βPA) and the systematic risk of 
pension liabilities (βPL). 
 
PR = βPA
PA
D+E
− βPL
PL
D+E
  (2) 
 
Fundamentally, the WACC is affected by pension risk because firms estimate their cost 
of capital based on past return data that reflect the systematic risk of their DB pension plans 
(Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). 
According to Bierman (1993), Graham and Harvey (2001), Brealey, Meyers, and Allen 
(2005), Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, and Jordan (2010), and Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar 
(2015), standard capital budgeting techniques rely on the WACC as a single, firm-wide 
operating discount rate. Equation (1) states that the WACC is positively related to systematic 
pension risk. Since pension risk is unrelated to the risk of a firm’s operating activity, the 
WACC is a biased estimate of the discount rate for the NPV estimation of operating projects 
                                                 
1
 Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) state the relation in risk terms and as a pre-tax cost of capital. They argue 
that this approach has the advantage that it removes the impact of financing which makes it more comparable 
across firms that potentially have different capital structures. 
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(Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). Following this argument we predict that corporate 
investment is negatively related to pension risk as an increase in systematic pension risk (PR) 
increases the hurdle rate required for project acceptance, leading the firm to reject valuable 
low-risk projects. What follows documents the specification and the results of an empirical 
test of this prediction. 
 
3. Data 
Firms in the U.S. can choose between two types of retirement saving instruments – 
defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans. In a DB plan, the firm guarantees 
its employees specific benefits upon retirement. This commitment represents a debt-like 
liability of the firm (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). Since 1974, firms are obligated by the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to guarantee their pension liability 
with assets on a legally segregated account. The difference between pension assets and 
pension liabilities determines the funding status of a plan. A funding status of less than zero 
represents an underfunding. Whenever a plan is underfunded, the firm must cover for the 
deficit by deficit reduction contributions (Rauh (2006)). Until 2006, ERISA required that 
firms amortize the underfunding of a DB plan within thirty years (Rauh (2006)). The Pension 
Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 reduced this amortization period to seven years (Campbell, 
Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012)). In addition to the deficit reduction contributions to 
underfunded plans, firms are required to cover the plans’ normal cost, which is the present 
value of pension benefits accrued during the year (Rauh (2006)). The sum of deficit reduction 
contributions and normal cost determines the firm’s mandatory pension contributions.2 When 
a firm fails to meet its mandatory contributions, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation 
(PBGC) is entitled to recover the outstanding amount by filing a claim against the firm. In a 
                                                 
2
 Rauh (2006) and Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012) provide a detailed discussion on mandatory 
pension contributions. 
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bankruptcy case, the PBGC claim has the most senior status (Shivdasani and Stefanescu 
(2010)). 
The firm’s responsibility in the case of DC plans is fundamentally different. The firm is 
simply committed to pay regular and fixed contributions to the employees’ retirement 
accounts. Upon retirement, the employees receive whatever amount of money (contributions 
plus interest) has accumulated on their behalf. The uncertainty about the level of retirement 
benefits is borne entirely by the employees. Besides the regular contributions, the firm faces 
no further obligations (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). Consistent with previous research, 
including Rauh (2006), Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), and Campbell, Dhaliwal, and 
Schwartz (2012), we exclude DC plans from our analysis. Throughout this paper, we 
consequently use the terms pension plan and defined benefit pension plan interchangeably. 
Our sample of DB pension sponsoring firms builds on data from the COMPUSTAT 
North America Pension database and the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged file. The 
COMPUSTAT North America Pension file contains firm level accounting data on DB 
pension plans. Corporate pension accounting in the U.S. is regulated by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Pension assets and liabilities are recorded off-balance 
sheet in the footnotes of the 10-K annual statements (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). The 
FASB requires that pension assets be measured by their market value. Moreover, since the 
release of FAS 132(R) in 2003, firms are required to disclose pension assets along the 
categories equities, bonds, real estate, and other investments. Pension liabilities on the other 
hand have to be estimated as the actuarial present value of the promised benefits. However, 
the rate at which firms discount the pension benefits has to reflect current interest rate levels 
(Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) and Carmichael and Graham (2012)). This makes sure that the 
actuarial value of pension liabilities is close to their fair, economic value. There are two 
common measures of a firm’s pension liability – the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) and 
the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO). While the ABO only consists of the present 
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value of the benefits that have already been earned by the employees, the PBO additionally 
includes the present value of the projected benefits that are attributable to future salary 
increases. The general obligation to disclose the ABO ended in 1998, when FAS 132 required 
disclosure only in case of severely underfunded plans. Even though Bodie (1990) argues that 
the ABO is the most accurate measure of the economic value of the pension liability, the lack 
of data after 1998 makes it an unfeasible measure during our observation period. We therefore 
quantify the pension liability by the PBO, which is in line with recent studies on corporate 
pension plans, including Franzoni and Marín (2006), Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz 
(2010), Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012), and An, Huang, and Zhang (2013).  
We limit our analysis to pension sponsoring firms and firm-years where complete 
accounting data are reported (book assets, market value of equity, book value of debt, capital 
expenditures, net income, depreciation, pension assets, pension asset classes, PBO, and 
pension contributions). Moreover, we exclude foreign firms with American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs). Our initial sample consists of 10,100 observations and covers the years 
from 2003 to 2012. The sample period starts in 2003 because the information on pension asset 
allocations is not available for previous years. This information is essential in our estimation 
of the systematic risk of pension assets. We do not exclude financial firms because Krüger, 
Landier, and Thesmar (2015) argue that these firms most likely base their investment 
decisions on discounted value evaluation techniques as well. Since we normalize our main 
variables by beginning-of-year assets, we require information about assets in at least two 
consecutive sample years, which reduces our sample size by 330 firm-years to 9,770 
observations concerning 1,562 firms.  
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4. Empirical method and variable construction 
In section 2, we argue that corporate investment is distorted by pension risk because of 
a pension risk bias in the operating discount rate. An empirical test of the relation between 
pension risk and investment hence requires that the investment measure reflects decisions that 
are presumably made on the basis of criteria such as NPV or internal rate of return (IRR). 
According to Bierman (1993), Graham and Harvey (2001), and Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar 
(2015), NPV and IRR are predominantly used in decisions about capital expenditures. 
Research and development expense (R&D), however, is often set as a fixed fraction of sales 
(Anthony and Govindarajan (2007)). Since NPV and IRR are hence less relevant in these 
investment decisions, R&D expense should be less sensitive to a bias in the operating 
discount rate. Therefore, we primarily measure investment by capital expenditures. In our 
main specification, we deduct depreciation expense to focus on decisions that do not reflect 
routine replacement activities for which NPV and IRR considerations might also be less 
relevant. 
 
4.1. Measures of pension risk 
Our empirical specification of the systematic pension risk follows Jin, Merton, and 
Bodie (2006) and is based on the functional relation reported in equation (2). First, we 
estimate the systematic pension asset risk (βPA) of firm j in year t as the weighted average 
(CAPM) beta of the pension asset classes. 
 
βPAj,t =
βEquities × Equitiesj,t
PAj,t
+
βBonds × Bondsj,t
PAj,t
+
βReal Estate × Real estatej,t
PAj,t
+
βAlternatives × Alternativesj,t
PAj,t
  (3) 
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The weight of each asset class is obtained from the COMPUSTAT North America 
Pension database. The betas we assume for equities, fixed income, and real estate are from 
Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006).
3
 The values are βEquities = 1, βBonds = 0.175, and 
βReal estate = 0.15. The asset class alternatives equals the COMPUSTAT category other, 
which comprises all assets that are not equity, bond, or real estate investments 
(COMPUSTAT (2004)). Since Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) do not consider alternative 
assets in their study, we rely on the beta of alternatives in Mohan and Zhang (2014). They 
argue that investments in alternative assets of DB pension plans predominantly consist of 
private equity, venture capital, and commodity investments, which have a beta of 1.2 on 
average.
4
  
For systematic pension liability risk we again rely on Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006). 
Based on the systematic risk of 30-year treasury bonds, they suggest two alternative point 
estimates; βPL1 = 0.18 and βPL2 = 0.46. In addition to these numbers, we consider a third 
estimate where we assume that the pension liability beta equals zero. Although this potentially 
underestimates the systematic risk of pension liabilities, it has the advantage that the 
systematic pension risk from equation (2) is reduced to the systematic risk of pension assets, 
which is independent from the pension liability definition (PBO vs. ABO) and the actuarial 
assumption on the discount rate of pension benefits. Our three estimates of systematic pension 
risk hence are 
 
 PR1j,t =
βPAj,t  × PAj,t−0.18 × PLj,t
Aj,t
 , (4) 
  PR2j,t =
βPAj,t  × PAj,t−0.46 × PLj,t
Aj,t
 , and (5) 
 PR3j,t =
βPAj,t  × PAj,t
Aj,t
 . (6) 
                                                 
3
 Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), Table 5, p. 9. 
4
 Mohan and Zhang (2014), Table 5, p. 407. 
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The variation in these estimates stems from changes in the asset allocation, changes in 
the pension funding status, and changes in the size of the pension plan relative to the size of 
the sponsoring firm. The assumptions about asset class and liability betas are constant over 
time and do not vary between firms. We normalize by book value of firm assets (A) because 
Rauh (2006) argues that all variables in the investment regression, which we discuss in the 
next section, should be scaled by the same quantity. Since book assets are also the 
denominator of Tobin’s Q, Rauh (2006) suggest to scale both pension and firm variables by 
the book value of assets. 
 
4.2. Regression model and discussion of the control variables 
Following a large body of investment literature, including Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Kaplan and Zingales (2000), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 
(2003), and Rauh (2006), we examine the pension risk sensitivity of investment in a linear 
regression model. The investment of firm j in year t, scaled by beginning-of-year book value 
of firm assets, is hence given by 
 
 Invj,t =  αj + αt + βPRj,t−1 + 𝚪′𝐗𝐣,𝐭 + ϵj,t , (7) 
 
where, αj identifies firm fixed effects, αt represents year fixed effects, 𝐗 is a set of 
control variables, 𝚪′ is a vector of coefficients, and ϵ is a stochastic error term. β identifies the 
pension risk sensitivity of investment. We expect that the value of β is negative. We consider 
the beginning-of-year systematic pension risk (PRj,t−1) because the end-of-year pension risk 
cannot yet be reflected in the stock returns that the firm uses to estimate the current year 
discount rate. 
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Including year fixed effects allows controlling for macroeconomic effects. Firm fixed 
effects control for firm specific differences in investment levels that remain constant over 
time. Our continuous control variables include the market-to-book ratio of the beginning-of-
year asset values (average Tobin’s Q), the current year nonpension cash flow (NPC), and the 
funding status of the firm’s beginning-of-year pension liability. Q is a standard control for the 
firm’s investment opportunities. NPC and funding status are controls for investment 
opportunities that are unobserved by Q (Rauh (2006)).  
Consistent with Rauh (2006), we define nonpension cash flow and funding status by 
 
 NPCj,t =  
Net incomej,t+Depreciation & Amortizationj,t+Pension expensej,t
Aj,t−1
  and (8) 
Funding statusj,t−1 =  
PAj,t−1−PBOj,t−1
Aj,t−1
 , (9) 
 
where PBO is the Projected Benefit Obligation.  
Furthermore, we control for financial leverage. Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) find that 
investment is negatively related to financial leverage. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) show 
that leverage is in turn negatively related to the ratio of pension liabilities to total assets, 
which is an important determinant of systematic pension risk. Failing to control for financial 
leverage could cause the coefficient of systematic pension risk to suffer from omitted variable 
bias.  
We also consider the possibility that mandatory pension contributions could crowd out 
the investment of firms that face external financing constraints (Rauh (2006)). That could 
explain our findings. Yet we cannot control for these contributions because COMPUSTAT 
does only provide information on total pension contributions, which are the sum of mandatory 
and voluntary payments. We can, however, distinguish between predicted and unexpected 
total contributions. According to Rauh (2006), financially constrained firms could take 
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measures to secure additional finance for predictable mandatory contributions. If so, the 
sensitivity of investment to mandatory contributions should primarily stem from unexpected 
mandatory contributions. In analogy to Rauh (2006), we therefore expect that total pension 
contributions affect the firms’ willingness to invest mainly via their unexpected rather than 
via their expected component. We measure unexpected contributions by the difference 
between the pension contributions that the firm effectively pays during a given year and the 
amount of contributions it has planned to pay as of the beginning of the fiscal year. Consistent 
with the normalization of the other variables in our regression model, we scale unexpected 
pension contributions by the beginning-of-year book value of firm assets. We inquire into the 
potential distortion of the pension risk sensitivity of investment by unobserved mandatory 
contributions in the section (5.3) on endogeneity. 
Finally, we control for the natural logarithm of the beginning-of-year book value of 
assets (Ln firm size) and the natural logarithm of firm age (Ln firm age) because firms with 
large pension plans, and hence large pension risk, are typically larger and older than firms 
with small pension plans (Rauh (2006)). Older firms might have fewer investment 
opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2015)). Detailed definitions of all the variables 
are displayed in Table 8 of the appendix. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive sample statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample of pension sponsoring firms from 2003 
to 2012. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percent level of their 
pooled distribution to eliminate outliers. On average, capital expenditures 
(Gross investment) correspond to 4.5 percent of firm assets and capital expenditures minus 
depreciation (Net investment) amount to 0.8 percent of assets. The positive mean of net 
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investment indicates that the average firm in our sample is growing (Lang, Ofek, and Stulz 
(1996)). The mean aggregate ratio of pension liabilities to firm assets (Pension Liability) is 
0.15 which, compared to an average financial leverage ratio (Leverage) of 0.25, illustrates 
that pension plans are an important corporate liability. The average funding status of -0.03 
indicates that the average firm’s pension liability is underfunded by 3 percent of the firm’s 
assets, which corresponds to an average underfunding of pension liabilities by 22 percent. The 
mean and the median systematic pension risk are positive for all specifications, which 
supports the claim of Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) that the systematic pension risk causes 
the WACC of the average pension sponsoring firm to exceed the value that would be 
appropriate for the firm’s operating business. The mean value of PR1 (0.060) amounts to 9 
percent of the average asset beta of U.S. firms, which, according to Damodaran (2015), is 
0.67. The 90
th
 percentile of PR1 (0.158) corresponds to 24 percent of the average asset beta, 
which shows that for some firms, the distortion of the discount rate by pension risk could be 
substantial. 
A large part of the overall variation in our main variables stems from within-firm 
variation over time. This is important because, in our main regression model (7), cross-
sectional variation is eliminated by firm fixed effects (Baltagi (2013)). The within-firm 
standard deviation of PR1 (0.026) equals one third of the overall standard deviation of PR1 
(0.077). In case of PR2 and PR3, the within-firm variation amounts to 58 and 29 percent of 
the overall variation, respectively. The within-firm standard deviation of our main investment 
variable (Net investment) corresponds to 61 percent of its overall standard deviation. For 
R&D, however, the within-firm variation only amounts to 25 percent of the total variation, 
which supports the view that R&D expense is stickier than capital expenditures, possibly 
because it is set as a fixed fraction of sales. 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
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Table 2 reports the pairwise Pearson correlation statistics between selected variables. 
The correlation between systematic pension risk and net investment is significantly negative 
for all pension risk measures, which represents univariate evidence of the distortion of 
corporate investment by DB pension plans. The correlation between net investment and the 
ratio of pension liabilities to firm assets is significantly negative as well. This is consistent 
with Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) and Merton (2006) who argue that pension firms overstate 
the discount rate (WACC) for operating projects because the standard calculation of WACC 
understates the leverage of these firms. The strong positive correlation between systematic 
pension risk and the ratio of pension liabilities to firm assets reflects that systematic pension 
risk is related to the size of the pension plan relative to the size of the firm. On average, firms 
with larger pension plans have higher pension risk. 
R&D expense is negatively correlated with systematic pension risk well. Compared to 
net investment, the correlation is however weaker and only significant when we measure 
pension risk by PR2. 
All our control variables are significantly correlated with net investment. With the sole 
exception of leverage, the control variables are also significantly correlated with systematic 
pension risk. This supports our approach to study the pension risk sensitivity of corporate 
investment in a multivariate regression analysis. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
5.2. The pension risk sensitivity of investment 
Table 3 studies the relation between corporate investment and systematic pension risk. 
The statistical significance of the coefficients is determined based on a two-tailed test with 
17 
 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. Column (1) displays the results of a regression of 
gross investment (capital expenditures) on systematic pension risk (PR1) and controls, 
including year fixed effects. The coefficient on pension risk takes a negative value of -0.052 
and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
investment decisions are distorted because firms are discounting expected project cash flows 
at a rate that is sensitive to systematic pension risk. Moreover, this result is in line with 
Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015), who find that segment investment of conglomerate 
firms is distorted because firms fail to adjust the discount rates for the difference in the 
systematic risk between their various business segments. 
Column (2) shows the results of our regression model (7) that controls also for firm 
fixed effects. In this analysis, the coefficient on systematic pension risk is only significant at 
the 5 percent level and takes a value of -0.036, which is below the estimate from the 
preceding regression. In Columns (3) and (4), we estimate the pension risk sensitivity of net 
investment (capital expenditures minus depreciation). Without firm fixed effects, the pension 
risk coefficient takes a value of -0.059. Including firm fixed effects slightly changes the 
estimate to -0.052. In both regressions, the relation between net investment and pension risk is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The comparably stronger pension risk sensitivity 
of net investment is in line with our expectation that pension risk primarily affects decisions 
on new investment because NPV and IRR evaluation techniques are less frequently used in 
pure replacement activities. 
The coefficients of the control variables in the regressions that include firm fixed effects 
are in line with previous studies regardless of whether investment is measured gross or net of 
depreciation. In accordance with Rauh (2006), we find that investment increases with the 
pension funding status, the nonpension cash flow, and Tobin’s Q, while it decreases with 
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unexpected pension contributions.
5
 Moreover, consistent with the findings in Lang, Ofek, and 
Stulz (1996), we find that investment is negatively related to leverage. With the exception of 
firm size and firm age, all coefficients are significantly different from zero. Firm size is 
significantly negatively related to gross investment but unrelated to net investment. The 
coefficient on firm age is insignificant and close to zero in magnitude. 
Columns (5) and (6) test for the robustness of our results to the assumption concerning 
the systematic risk of pension liabilities. We find that net investment is negatively related to 
both alternative measures of systematic pension risk – PR2 and PR3. We obtain a similar 
result in not tabulated regressions of gross investment. 
The distortion of corporate investment by systematic pension risk is also of economic 
significance. Based on the coefficients from Column (4), a one standard deviation increase of 
pension risk (0.08) decreases net investment by 0.11 standard deviations (1 SD = 0.036). This 
represents a decrease in the ratio of capital expenditures to assets by 19 percent. Given the 
total asset value of our sample firms of USD 2.3 trillion, this corresponds to an annual USD 
amount of 90 billion.  
The remainder of Table 3 concerns the causality of the relation between pension risk 
and investment. A detailed discussion on endogeneity and further considerations on causality 
follow in the remainder of this paper. Columns (7) and (8) test for the pension risk sensitivity 
of R&D expense. Unlike capital expenditures, R&D is often set as a fixed fraction of sales 
(Anthony and Govindarajan (2007)). Therefore, it should be fairly insensitive to distortions in 
the discount rate. Indeed, regardless of whether the regression includes firm fixed effects, 
                                                 
5
 In not tabulated regressions, we replace unexpected contributions by the mandatory pension 
contribution estimate of Campbell, Dhaliwal and Schwartz (2012). This results in a positive contribution 
coefficient, which is inconsistent with Rauh (2006). We also receive positive coefficients for the Campbell et al. 
measure when we exactly replicate the regressions in Campbell, Dhaliwal and Schwartz (2012), p. 891, Table 2, 
Colum (3) and Column (4) for our sample period. We explain this result in the way that the measure of 
Campbell, Dhaliwal and Schwartz (2012) is based on the number of years a firm is allowed to take to eliminate 
an underfunding. In 2008, this period changed from 30 to 7 years. The Campbell et al. measure thus potentially 
suffers from a structural break within our sample period (2003 – 2012). Replacing unexpected pension 
contributions by a simple measure of overall pension contributions has virtually no impact on the coefficient on 
systematic pension risk. 
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R&D expense is not significantly related to systematic pension risk (PR1). In not tabulated 
regressions, we receive a similar result for PR2 and PR3. 
According to Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), the WACC is affected by systematic 
pension risk because firms estimate their cost of capital based on past return data that reflect 
the risk of their DB pension plans. Since firms usually determine the WACC based on more 
than one year of past stock return information (Brotherson, Eades, Harris, and Higgins 
(2013)), investment decisions should also be sensitive to systematic pension risk measures 
lagged by two years. The evidence in Column (9) supports this prediction. We find that net 
investment is significantly negative related to both the one-year and the two-year lag of 
systematic pension risk. We obtain a similar result when we measure systematic pension risk 
by PR2 and PR3, respectively, or when we use gross investment as the dependent variable 
(not tabulated). The regression in Column (10) additionally includes the current year 
systematic pension risk. In section 4.2, we argue that investment should not be affected by the 
current year systematic pension risk because this information is not yet reflected in the stock 
returns that the firm uses to estimate the discount rate. Consistent with this reasoning the 
coefficient on end-of-year systematic pension risk is not statistically different from zero. In a 
not tabulated regression, we receive a similar result for the one year lead systematic pension 
risk. 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
 
5.3. Endogeneity 
This section elaborates further on the causality of the relation between pension risk and 
investment and discusses potential endogeneity concerns. 
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5.3.1. Pension freezes and financial distress 
In recent years, many firms have frozen their DB pension plans and replaced new DB 
promises by contributions to DC plans, where the uncertainty about future retirement benefits 
lies entirely with the employees (Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes (2013)). When a DB plan is 
frozen, future accruals are discontinued. The firm’s existing (DB) pension obligations, 
however, remain (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). Since the WACC reflects the risk from 
existing pension assets and liabilities (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)), the relation between 
pension risk and investment should be robust to pension freezes. We test for this robustness 
by separately estimating the pension risk sensitivity of investment of firms with frozen DB 
plans and firms with open DB plans. The first two columns of Table 4 present the results. 
We identify firms with frozen plans by the reported rate of compensation increase, 
which is the firms’ estimate of the increase in the employees' salaries that will affect future 
pension plan payments.
6
 According to FAS 87, a firm is only required to disclose this item if 
it sponsors pay-related plans, which are plans where the benefits increase with the salary of 
the employees. Since wage related benefit adjustments are explicitly discontinued in (hard) 
frozen plans, we conclude that firms that do not report the rate of compensation increase have 
frozen their DB plans.
7
 Based on this identification criterion, we find that the number of firms 
with frozen DB plans has steadily increased from 90 in 2003 to 320 in 2012. In an average 
year, 25 firms freeze their DB pension plans. However, there is also a small number of 7 firms 
per year that unfreeze their DB plans.  
We find that the coefficient on PR1 is negative and statistically significant in both 
subsamples. In not tabulated regressions, we receive a similar result for gross investment and 
our alternative pension risk measures. This shows that the pension risk sensitivity of 
                                                 
6
 The reported rate of compensation increase is represented by the COMPUSTAT item pprci. 
7
 In a soft freeze, it is only future accruals from additional years of service that are discontinued. The 
pension obligation is still adjusted for increases in the employees’ salaries (Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes 
(2013)). 
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investment is robust to plan freezes. Moreover, it implies that a further increase in the number 
of firms with frozen DB plans is unlikely to diminish the economic importance of our finding. 
In the second part of Table 4, we test whether our results could be driven by financially 
distressed firms. Bodie, Light, Morck, and Taggart (1985), Bodie (1996), and Jin, Merton, 
and Bodie (2006) argue that financially distressed pension sponsors face a put option on their 
pension liability by the PBGC. In case the plan sponsor goes bankrupt, the PBGC takes over 
the pension liabilities. This pension put potentially incentivizes firms in financial distress to 
invest the pension assets in securities with higher systematic risk (Jin, Merton, and Bodie 
(2006)). According to Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990), financially distressed firms 
have also a tendency to cut investment. The negative relation between pension risk and 
investment could hence be driven by financially distressed firms that simultaneously increase 
their pension risk and reduce their investment. To address this concern, we repeat our analysis 
for nondistressed firms only. Following Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we measure financial 
distress based on (1) book to market ratio, (2) return on investment, and (3) financial 
leverage.
8
 Based on each of these criteria, we construct a subsample of firms where 
investment decisions are unlikely affected by financial distress. In each year, we exclude the 
90
th
 percentile of firms that appeared the most severe financially distressed the year before. In 
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 4, we show the estimates for these subsamples of nondistressed 
firms. In all regressions, we estimate a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
systematic pension risk that is close to -0.05 in magnitude, which is comparable to the 
pension risk sensitivity of net investment in in the entire sample. We receive a similar result 
for gross investment and PR2 and PR3 in not tabulated regressions. This indicates that our 
results are not driven by firms in financial distress. 
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
8
 The definitions are given in Table 8 of the appendix. 
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5.3.2. Unobserved mandatory contributions 
Rauh (2006) finds that investment of financially constrained firms declines with 
mandatory pension contributions because firms that lack access to external financing 
resources face a trade-off between spending a dollar on investment and spending this dollar 
on mandatory pension contributions. Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012) show that 
Rauh’s result is explained by the positive impact of mandatory contributions on the WACC of 
financially constrained firms. So far, we control for this effect by including unexpected 
pension contributions as a control variable. This might however be insufficient to control for 
the correlation between mandatory contributions and pension risk. Our finding could hence 
still be a consequence of an omitted variable bias. If this was the case, the pension risk 
sensitivity of investment could actually reflect the crowding out of investment by mandatory 
contributions, as argued by Rauh (2006). It would however also imply that the pension risk 
sensitivity of investment is limited to financially constrained firms. Unconstrained firms can 
easily replace cash outflows by additional external financing. Their investment activity should 
thus be unaffected by mandatory contributions. On the other hand, if the sensitivity of 
investment to pension risk is caused by a discount rate bias in the capital budgeting process, it 
should affect pension sponsoring firms at large regardless of financing constraints. To 
distinguish between these two explanations, we follow Rauh (2006) and repeat our analysis 
for different subsamples where we sort the firms along different possible proxies for financing 
constraints. Table 5 presents the results. In each panel, the most severe financially constrained 
firms constitute the first subsample, partially constrained firms form the second subsample, 
and comparably unconstrained firms make up the third subsample. We display the results of 
regressions of net investment on PR1 and controls, including year and firm fixed effects. Our 
findings remain qualitatively unaffected when we consider regressions of gross investment or 
alternatively measure systematic pension risk by PR2 and PR3.  
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Overall, we find that pension risk is negatively related to investment independently of 
financing constraints, which is consistent with the existence of a discount rate bias. 
Unexpected pension contributions, however, primarily affect the investment of financially 
constrained firms, which is in line with the results of Rauh (2006) for mandatory pension 
contributions.  
The first panel, where we sort firms along their median age, shows a significant 
negative impact of pension risk on investment for middle aged and old firms, which are 
comparably unconstrained. On the other hand, the coefficient on unexpected pension 
contributions is only statistically significant for young firms, where its magnitude (-0.182) is 
more twenty times its value in the sample of the oldest firms (-0.009).  
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue that firm age, together with firm size, is a particularly 
good indicator of financing constraints. Hence, they combine the two measures in their size-
age (SA) index, which we use to sort the firms in the second panel.
9
 We find that investment 
decreases with systematic pension risk both for firms with high SA index values (higher 
financing constraints) and firms with low SA index values. The coefficient on unexpected 
pension contributions is however only statistically significant for firms with high SA index 
values. The investment of firms with low SA index values is essentially unaffected by 
unexpected pension contributions. 
The third panel classifies firms according to their S&P credit rating into firms with no 
credit rating, firms with a credit rating that is below investment grade (BBB-), and investment 
grade firms. While we find a negative and statistically significant pension risk sensitivity of 
investment in all subsamples, the coefficient on unexpected pension contributions is only 
statistically significant for firms with no rating. 
The fourth panel divides the sample along the median dividend-to-assets ratio. In 
analogy to Rauh (2006), the investment of firms with low dividend ratios displays the 
                                                 
9
 The detailed SA index calculation is provided in Table 8 of the appendix. 
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strongest sensitivity to unexpected pension contributions, while we observe no significant 
relation for high dividend paying firms. On the other hand, investment of high dividend as 
well as low dividend firms is significantly negatively affected by systematic pension risk. 
Altogether, the results of the analyses in this section represent evidence against an 
explanation of the pension risk sensitivity of investment by unobserved mandatory 
contributions. On the contrary, they indicate that pension risk affects corporate investment on 
top of the distortion from mandatory contributions, as identified by Rauh (2006). 
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
 
 
5.3.3. Unobserved investment opportunities 
A further endogeneity concern is that our results could be caused by the correlation of 
systematic pension risk with unobserved investment opportunities of the sponsoring firm. The 
correlation of an explanatory variable of investment with unobserved investment 
opportunities is a well-known issue in the investment literature. Historically, the problem 
primarily concerned the analysis of the cash flow sensitivity of investment (e.g. Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), Kaplan and Zingales (2000), Erickson and Whited (2000), and Rauh (2006)). 
The same endogeneity concern applies to our study because firms with higher systematic 
pension risk are typically older than firms with small pension plans and these firms might 
have fewer investment opportunities (Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2015)). To mitigate the 
concern that systematic pension risk is correlated with unobserved investment opportunities, 
we match each pension-sponsoring firm to a comparable nonpension firm, i.e., a firm that 
does not sponsor a DB pension plan. Our sample of nonpension firms includes all 
COMPUSTAT firms that are not listed on the COMPUSTAT North America Pension 
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database. Systematic pension risk is zero for these firms (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)) and 
therefore by definition uncorrelated with unobserved investment opportunities. Thus, a 
negative and significant coefficient on pension risk in this matched sample is unlikely the 
consequence of a correlation of pension risk with unobserved investment opportunities. 
We perform a one-to-one matching of pension to nonpension firms based on propensity 
scores for each fiscal year, without replacement, using a caliper of 1 percent. Our matching 
variables are Tobin’s Q, cash flow, book leverage, book value of assets, firm age, and Fama 
French 48 industry membership. We use these criteria because they represent important 
determinants of corporate investment and pension firms typically differ from nonpension 
firms along these dimensions. Firms that sponsor a DB plan tend to be older and larger than 
firms without DB plan (Rauh (2006)). Therefore, they likely have fewer growth opportunities 
(Loderer, Stulz, and Waelchli (2015)). Moreover, pension firms are more leveraged and have 
higher operating cash flows than nonpension firms (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). 
Finally, due to the historical evolution of pension plans and the emergence of DC plans, firms 
that sponsor a DB plan usually belong to more traditional industries. We calculate the 
propensity scores based on the method suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006) and originally 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
10
 The procedure provides us with a sample of 
9,548 observations (4,774 pension firm-years and 4,774 nonpension firm-years).  
Table 6 reports the results of the analysis. In Column (1), we regress net investment on an 
identifier variable for pension firms (b DBP sponsor), the continuous nonpension variables 
from equation (7), and year fixed effects. The coefficient on b DBP sponsor takes a value 
of -0.007. This suggests that net investment (relative to assets) of pension firms is on average 
approximately 0.7 percentage points lower than net investment of nonpension firms. This 
corresponds to 14 percent of the average capital expenditures to assets ratio (0.049) of the 
firms in this matched sample.  
                                                 
10
 This is implemented in the STATA module psmatch2 of Leuven and Sianesi (2014) 
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In Column (2), we extend the regression by the systematic pension risk (PR1). In this 
regression, the coefficient on b DBP sponsor decreases to -0.004. The coefficient on pension 
risk is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that a sizable part of the relatively 
lower investment of pension firms is explained by systematic pension risk, which is consistent 
with the interpretation that pension firms underinvest, on average. In Columns (3) to (5), we 
test our original two-way fixed effects specification from equation (7) and estimate the 
pension risk sensitivity based on our three pension risk measures (PR1, PR2, and PR3). 
Similar to our main analysis in section 5.2, including firm fixed effects allows controlling for 
omitted variables that remain constant over time. The pension risk sensitivity of investment is 
negative and statistically significant in all estimations. Column (6) shows that pension risk is 
also negatively related to gross investment.
11
 The consistency of these results with our main 
findings in section 5.2 alleviates the concern that the pension risk sensitivity of investment is 
induced by a negative correlation between pension risk and unobserved investment 
opportunities. 
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
5.4. Reaction of nonpension firms 
As pointed out in the introduction, we finally examine the reaction of firms that do not 
sponsor a DB plan (nonpension firms) to the distortion of investment at pension firms. Our 
explanation of the pension risk sensitivity of investment implies that pension firms forgo 
economically valuable investment opportunities. Rauh (2006) presents evidence that 
nonpension firms capture the forgone investment opportunities of financially constrained 
                                                 
11
 In not tabulated regressions, we receive a similar result for PR2 and PR3. 
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pension firms in their industry. With a similar argument, we therefore expect that nonpension 
firms seize the investment opportunities that pension firms forgo because of the pension risk 
bias in their discount rate. We test this prediction by inquiring into whether the investment 
activities of nonpension firms are positively related to the industry-wide pension risk.  
For each Fama-French 48 industry (h), we first sum the not normalized pension risk of 
all pension firms in that industry. Since the magnitude of aggregate industry pension risk is 
important to nonpension firms only if it is large relative to the aggregate size of their own 
balance sheet assets, we then normalize this amount by the beginning-of-year aggregate book 
value of assets of all nonpension firms in that industry. Equation (10) shows the calculation.
12
  
 
Industry PRh,t =  
∑ βPAj,t×PAj,t−βPL×PLj,tj∈h,DB
∑ Ai,t−1i∈h,i∉DB
 , (10) 
 
where DB is the set of firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan, j is an identifier 
of pension firms, and i is an identifier of nonpension firms. Consistent with our previous 
analyses, we measure PA by the market value of pension assets, PL by the PBO, and A by the 
book value of firm assets. We determine the industry pension risk for an assumed pension 
liability beta (βPL) of 0.18 (Industry PR1), 0.46 (Industry PR2), and 0 (Industry PR3), 
respectively. Similarly, we also estimate the industry unexpected pension contributions. 
Detailed definitions of all industry pension measures are provided in Table 8 of the appendix. 
Table 7 reports the results of our regressions of investment of nonpension firms on 
industry pension risk, industry unexpected pension contributions, Tobin’s Q, cash flow, 
leverage, and firm size. In analogy to Rauh (2006), we cluster the standard errors at the 
industry level. In the first three columns of Table (7), we examine the sensitivity of net 
investment to our three specifications of industry pension risk. We find a significant positive 
                                                 
12
 We calculate industry pension risk analogous to the calculation of industry mandatory contributions in 
Rauh (2006). 
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industry pension risk sensitivity of net investment of nonpension firms in all regressions. 
Column (4) shows that gross investment of nonpension firms is significantly positively related 
to industry pension risk as well.
13
 Although it is not statistically significant, the coefficient on 
industry unexpected pension contributions is positive. This is consistent with Rauh (2006), 
who shows that nonpension firms capture investment that is crowded out by mandatory 
pension contributions. With the exception of the natural logarithm of age, which is 
significantly negatively related to investment of nonpension firms, the signs and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the remaining control variables are comparable to the 
estimates in or preceding analyses. 
We interpret the results from Table (7) as supporting evidence for our explanation of the 
pension risk sensitivity of investment with a discount rate bias. It shows that the forgone 
valuable investment by firms that use distorted discount rates is undertaken by firms whose 
capital budgeting process is not analogously biased. 
 
[insert Table 7 here] 
 
  
                                                 
13
 In not tabulated regressions, where we estimate the industry pension risk based on PR2 and PR3, 
respectively, we receive qualitatively similar results.  
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6. Conclusion 
By analyzing a large sample of U.S. firms, we find that corporate investment is 
negatively affected by systematic pension risk and that pension firms underinvest, on average. 
The effect is economically large and not limited to firms that have not yet frozen their defined 
benefit pension plans. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that using the WACC 
as a firm-wide discount rate distorts capital budgeting decisions because the standard 
calculation of WACC fails to ignore the size and the systematic risk of pension assets and 
liabilities, which are both unrelated to a firm’s operating business. Our findings cannot be 
explained by financing constraints of the sponsoring firms or the correlation of systematic 
pension risk with unobserved investment opportunities. The distortion of investment by 
pension risk occurs on top of the effect from mandatory contributions, as identified by Rauh 
(2006). The forgone investment by pension firms is partially seized by firms that do not suffer 
from a pension risk bias in their capital budgeting process. 
We contribute to the investment literature by showing that corporate investment is 
distorted by an important nonoperating systematic risk in the computation of discount rates. 
Existing research finds that using a single discount rate in the NPV analysis of investment 
projects distorts the resource allocation within the firm. We find that it can distort the resource 
allocation between firms as well. Hence, we believe that the relevance of this paper goes 
beyond pension economics. Our findings apply to all firms that base their investment 
decisions on a single discount rate without noticing the different sources of systematic risk.   
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive sample statistics 
This table shows the descriptive sample statistics of our main variables.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The data refer to 
2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan.  All variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
 Mean Median Min 10th %ile 90th %ile Max 
Std. 
(overall) 
Std.  
(within) 
N 
Gross investment 0.045 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.099 0.259 0.046 0.023 9,770 
Net investment 0.008 -0.000 -0.053 -0.022 0.048 0.180 0.036 0.022 9,770 
R&D 0.029 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.196 0.038 0.010 4,563 
PR1  0.060 0.031 -0.003 0.002 0.158 0.395 0.077 0.026 9,770 
PR2 0.017 0.004 -0.052 -0.008 0.059 0.202 0.038 0.022 9,770 
PR3 0.087 0.048 0.001 0.005 0.222 0.542 0.107 0.031 9,770 
Pension liability 0.154 0.093 0.002 0.010 0.374 0.967 0.180 0.046 9,770 
Funding status -0.031 -0.016 -0.226 -0.084 0.000 0.061 0.045 0.023 9,770 
Unexpected contributions 0.001 0.000 -0.020 -0.002 0.007 0.031 0.006 0.006 9,719 
NPC 0.090 0.085 -0.171 0.007 0.189 0.377 0.085 0.053 9,770 
Q 1.499 1.261 0.730 0.949 2.343 5.004 0.723 0.328 9,770 
Leverage 0.245 0.224 0.000 0.031 0.483 0.835 0.177 0.069 9,770 
Firm assets ($m) 15,677 2,544 36 275 29,016 427,452 51,647 8,277 9,770 
Firm age  34 32 5 9 62 86 22 2 9,770 
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Table 2: Pearson correlation matrix 
This table shows the pairwise Pearson correlations between selected variables.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor 
a defined benefit pension plan.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged periods.  The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level using a two-tailed test.  All variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) Net investment 1             
(2) R&D -0.1238* 1            
(3) PR1 -1 -0.0849* -0.0283 1           
(4) PR2-1 -0.0325* -0.0386* 0.8478* 1          
(5) PR3-1 -0.0932* -0.0244 0.9918* 0.7774* 1         
(6) Pension liability -1 -0.1064* -0.0091 0.9067* 0.5612* 0.9516* 1        
(7) Funding status-1 0.1079* -0.019 -0.3791* 0.0583* -0.4668* -0.6585* 1       
(8) Unexpected contributions -0.0258* -0.0143 0.1672* 0.0576* 0.1872* 0.2236* -0.2456* 1      
(9) NPC 0.2077* 0.0559* 0.1603* 0.1141* 0.1648* 0.1647* -0.1271* 0.1170* 1     
(10) Q-1 0.1101* 0.3114* 0.1327* 0.1319* 0.1266* 0.1073* -0.0297* 0.0648* 0.5977* 1    
(11) Leverage-1 -0.0292* -0.2144* -0.0083 -0.0041 -0.0080 -0.0065 -0.0180 -0.0122 -0.0757* -0.0959* 1   
(12) Ln firm size -1 0.0569* -0.0694* -0.0773* -0.0033 -0.0906* -0.1183* 0.1631* 0.0234* -0.1028* -0.1061* 0.1272* 1  
(13) Ln firm age 0.0773* -0.0620* 0.2598* 0.2075* 0.2605* 0.2450* -0.1257* 0.0839* 0.0840* 0.0106 -0.0291* 0.1958* 1 
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Table 3: The pension risk sensitivity of investment 
This table shows the results of our main regressions of corporate investment on the distortion in the WACC by systematic pension risk according to Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), and controls.  
The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged 
periods.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a 
two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
Dependent variable  Gross investment   Net investment   R&D   Net investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           PR1-1 -0.052*** -0.036** -0.059*** -0.052***   -0.009 0.004 -0.044*** -0.031* 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.009) (0.016)   (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.017) 
PR2-1     -0.062***      
     (0.019)      
PR3-1      -0.043***     
      (0.013)     
PR1-2         -0.022*** -0.022*** 
         (0.008) (0.008) 
PR1          -0.019 
          (0.013) 
Unexpected contributions -0.237*** -0.056 -0.123* -0.082* -0.079* -0.084* -0.077 -0.005 -0.115* -0.110* 
 (0.079) (0.051) (0.066) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.081) (0.024) (0.059) (0.059) 
Funding status-1 0.021 0.052** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.081*** 0.056*** -0.045* 0.001 0.061*** 0.056** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.024) (0.012) (0.023) (0.024) 
NPC 0.257*** 0.060*** 0.113*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** -0.090*** -0.010 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (0.019) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Q-1 -0.007*** 0.012*** -0.002 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage-1 0.033*** -0.041*** -0.003 -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.006 -0.042*** -0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Ln firm size-1 -0.002*** -0.007*** 0.001** 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.012*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln firm age 0.006*** 0.003 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* 0.000 0.005 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
           
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Observations 8,076 8,076 8,076 8,076 8,076 8,076 3,798 3,798 6,585 6,585 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.197 0.765 0.098 0.626 0.626 0.626 0.163 0.938 0.640 0.640 
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Table 4: Plan freezes and financial distress 
This table shows the results of our tests on whether the pension risk sensitivity of investment is affected by plan freezes and 
financial distress of the sponsoring firms.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  Subscripts 
indicate the number of lagged periods.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
Dependent variable  Net investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample restricted to Firms that sponsor 
hard frozen plans 
Firms that sponsor 
not hard frozen 
plans 
Nondistressed 
firms by 
book-market ratio 
Nondistressed 
firms by 
ROI 
Nondistressed 
firms by 
financial leverage 
      PR1-1 -0.069* -0.046*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.045*** 
 (0.041) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Unexpected contributions -0.126 -0.054 -0.077* -0.076 -0.087* 
 (0.177) (0.050) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) 
Funding status-1 -0.010 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.076*** 0.064*** 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
NPC 0.038** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Q-1 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage-1 -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.039*** 
 (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Ln firm size-1 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln firm age 0.020 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
      
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 1,834 6,242 7,294 7,334 7,311 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.614 0.644 0.622 0.634 0.622 
 
34 
 
Table 5: The pension risk sensitivity of investment in subsamples defined by alternative indicators of financing constraints 
This table shows the results of regressions of net investment on systematic pension risk and controls with the sample divided by hypothesized a priori indicators of financing constraints.  
Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 
99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged periods.  All regressions control for year and firm fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. 
    Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable 
   PR-1 
Unexpected 
contributions 
Funding status-1 NPC Q-1 Leverage-1 Ln firm size-1 Ln firm age 
Net investment Count Min Max Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) Coeff (t-Stat) 
Panel 1: Sorting by median firm age 
Age (youngest) 2,721 5 19 -0.029 (-0.89) -0.182 (-1.66) 0.009 (0.33) 0.034 (2.93) 0.015 (3.63) -0.052 (-5.86) 0.006 (2.06) -0.000 (-0.03) 
Age (middle) 2,728 20 45 -0.095 (-2.62) -0.120 (-1.20) 0.088 (1.86) 0.035 (2.50) 0.011 (3.17) -0.025 (-2.18) -0.004 (-1.04) 0.045 (1.05) 
Age (oldest) 2,627 46 86 -0.040 (-1.97) -0.009 (-0.19) 0.078 (3.21) 0.048 (2.12) 0.012 (3.97) -0.052 (-4.96) -0.001 (-0.18) -0.146 (-2.29) 
Panel 2:  Sorting by median SA index 
High SA index 2,695 -3.798 -2.907 -0.068 (-1.88) -0.199 (-1.72) 0.046 (1.20) 0.037 (3.13) 0.011 (2.69) -0.051 (-5.61) 0.003 (1.02) -0.008 (-0.69) 
Middle SA index 2,686 -4.808 -3.798 -0.052 (-1.47) -0.098 (-1.13) 0.061 (1.20) 0.034 (2.15) 0.014 (4.66) -0.022 (-1.84) -0.001 (-0.22) 0.043 (1.79) 
Low SA index 2,695 -6.496 -4.808 -0.044 (-2.20) -0.005 (-0.10) 0.067 (2.83) 0.048 (2.18) 0.011 (3.79) -0.051 (-5.09) -0.000 (-0.14) -0.092 (-1.52) 
Panel 3: Sorting by median S&P credit rating 
No S&P credit rating 3,119 - - -0.070 (-2.18) -0.182 (-2.18) 0.046 (1.23) 0.027 (1.62) 0.012 (3.19) -0.046 (-3.94) -0.001 (-0.17) -0.004 (-0.42) 
S&P credit rating (low) 1,778 D BB+ -0.046 (-1.63) -0.054 (-0.55) 0.080 (2.01) 0.033 (2.67) 0.017 (4.85) -0.040 (-4.49) 0.003 (1.19) 0.006 (0.58) 
S&P credit rating (high) 3,179 BBB- AAA -0.033 (-2.13) -0.005 (-0.09) 0.077 (3.28) 0.070 (4.89) 0.009 (4.22) -0.030 (-3.18) 0.000 (0.04) 0.010 (1.55) 
Panel 4: Sorting by median dividend-to-asset ratio 
Low dividend 2,696 0.000 0.002 -0.090 (-3.27) -0.211 (-2.07) 0.039 (1.15) 0.022 (1.46) 0.014 (2.98) -0.050 (-4.87) 0.002 (0.57) -0.002 (-0.15) 
Middle dividend 2,684 0.002 0.014 -0.018 (-0.56) -0.072 (-0.75) 0.058 (1.63) 0.065 (4.02) 0.016 (4.65) -0.036 (-3.69) 0.002 (0.56) 0.007 (0.92) 
High dividend 2,696 0.014 0.868 -0.041 (-1.88) -0.037 (-0.66) 0.088 (2.70) 0.037 (2.58) 0.009 (3.34) -0.030 (-3.16) -0.001 (-0.19) 0.003 (0.27) 
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Table 6: Matched sample regressions 
This table shows the results of regressions of corporate investment on the distortion in the WACC by systematic pension risk 
in a matched sample of firms that sponsor a defined benefit pension plan and firms that do not sponsor a defined benefit 
pension plan.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is constructed by a one-to-one 
matching of pension to nonpension firms based on propensity scores for each fiscal year, without replacement, and a caliper 
of 1 percent. The matching variables are Tobin’s Q, cash flow, financial leverage, book value of assets, firm age, and Fama 
French 48 industry membership.  The calculation of the propensity scores is based on the methodology suggested by Abadie 
and Imbens (2006).  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Subscripts 
indicate the number of lagged periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level 
using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. 
Dependent variable  Net investment   Gross Investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       b DBP sponsor -0.007*** -0.004**     
 (0.002) (0.002)     
PR1 -1  -0.061*** -0.093**   -0.091** 
  (0.013) (0.041)   (0.044) 
PR2-1    -0.114**   
    (0.054)   
PR3 -1     -0.076**  
     (0.034)  
Unexpected contributions   -0.186* -0.177 -0.189* -0.183 
   (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.123) 
Funding status-1   0.074 0.108* 0.056 0.052 
   (0.051) (0.057) (0.049) (0.052) 
NPC 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Q-1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Leverage-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.047*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Ln firm size-1 0.002*** 0.001*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln firm age -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Firm fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 8,617 8,578 8,578 8,578 8,578 8,578 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.059 0.062 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.717 
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Table 7: Investment response of nonpension firms 
This table reports the results of regressions of corporate investment of nonpension firms on aggregate industry pension risk 
and controls.  Variable definitions are in Table 8.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  Columns (1) to (3) are regressions on net 
investment; regression (4) is a regression on gross investment.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile 
of their pooled distribution.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry 
level. 
Dependent variable  Net investment   Gross investment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Industry PR1-1 0.004***   0.004** 
 (0.001)   (0.001) 
Industry PR2-1  0.007*   
  (0.004)   
Industry PR3-1   0.002***  
   (0.001)  
Industry unexpected contributions 0.007 0.019 0.004 0.006 
 (0.055) (0.049) (0.057) (0.057) 
Cash flow 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.018 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Q-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage-1 -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.053*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Ln firm size-1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln firm age -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 21,692 21,692 21,692 21,692 
R2 adjusted 
 
0.554 0.554 0.554 0.667 
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Table 8: Variable definitions 
This table summarizes the variable definitions.  The data are from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database and the 
COMPUSTAT North America Pension database.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged periods.   
Variable Definition (incl. COMPUSTAT mnemonics) 
b DBP sponsor Binary variable that takes a value of one when the firm is listed on the COMPUSTAT North America Pension database in 
the current year, and zero otherwise. 
Net investment  Difference of capital expenditures (capx) and depreciation (dp) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at-1). 
Gross investment Capital expenditures (capx) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at-1). 
R&D Research and development expense (xrd) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at-1). 
Pension asset beta Weighted average (CAPM) beta of the firm’s pension assets (pplao + pplau). Asset class weights in percent are equities 
(pnate), fixed income securities (pnatd), real estate (pnatr), and other assets (pnato). The category other assets contains 
all residual assets, which are mainly alternative assets. 
The assumed asset betas are as follows: 
Beta equities = 1  (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)) 
Beta fixed income securities =0.175 (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)) 
Beta real estate = 0.15 (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)) 
Beta other = 1.2 (Mohan and Zhang (2014)) 
βPA =
(1 ×  pnate + 0.175 ×  pnatd + 0.15 ×  pnatr + 1.2 ×  pnato)/100
pplao +  pplau
 
Pension liability Pension liabilities (pbpro + pbpru) to assets (at).  
PR1 Systematic pension risk 1: Pension asset beta (βPA) multiplied by the market value of pension assets (pplao + pplau) 
minus 0.18 times the PBO (pbpro + pbpru) normalized by assets (at). 
PR2 Systematic pension risk 2: Pension asset beta (βPA) multiplied by the market value of pension assets (pplao + pplau) 
minus 0.46 times the PBO (pbpro + pbpru) normalized by assets (at). 
PR3 Systematic pension risk 3: Pension asset beta (βPA) multiplied by the market value of pension assets (pplao + pplau) 
normalized by assets (at). 
Unexpected contributions Difference between effective employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans (pbec) and the beginning-of-year 
expectation of pension contributions (pbece-1) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at-1). If the beginning-of-year 
expectation of pension contributions is missing, it is replaced by the previous year effective contribution (pbec-1). 
Funding status Difference between the market value of pension assets (pplao + pplau) and the PBO (pbpro + pbpru) normalized by 
assets (at).  
NPC Nonpension cash flow according to Rauh (2006): Sum of net income (ni), depreciation and amortization (dp), and pension 
expense (xpr ) normalized by beginning-of-year assets (at-1). 
Q Average Tobin’s Q: Market value of equity (csho × prcc_f) plus assets (at) minus the book value of common equity 
including deferred taxes (ceq + txdb) normalized by assets (at). 
Leverage Financial leverage: The ratio of book value of debt (dltt + dlc) to assets (at).  
Ln firm size Natural logarithm of assets in million USD (at). 
Ln firm age Natural logarithm of the difference between the current fiscal year and the year of birth of the firm. The year of birth is 
calculated as the first year the firm appears on the CRSP tapes or on the COMPUSTAT files or a link is indicated on the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database. 
Book market ratio Book value of equity (at- dltt – dlc) divided by market value of equity (csho × prcc_f). 
ROI Return on investment: Net investment (ni) divided by book value of assets (at). 
SA Index -0.737 times the natural logarithm of assets (at) plus 0.043 times the squared natural logarithm of assets (at2) minus 0.04 
times the firm’s age in years. 
Dividend-to-asset ratio Dividends paid (dvc) divided by book value of assets (at). 
Cash-to-asset ratio Cash and equivalents (che) divided by book value of assets (at).  
Industry PR The sum of the not normalized systematic pension risk of all pension firms in a Fama-French 48 industry divided by the 
beginning-of-year aggregated assets of nonpension firms in the same industry. 
Industry PRh,t =  
∑ βPAj,t × (pplao j,t +  pplauj,t) − βPL × (pbproj,t  + pbpruj,t)j∈h,DB
∑ ati,t−1i∈h,i∉DB
 
Industry PR1 assumes a pension liability beta (βPL) of 0.18, Industry PR2 assumes a pension liability beta of 0.46, and 
Industry PR3 assumes a pension liability beta of 0. 
Industry unexpected contributions The sum of the unexpected pension contributions of all pension firms in a Fama-French 48 industry divided by the 
aggregated assets of nonpension firms in the same industry. 
Industry unexpected contributiionsh,t =  
∑ (pbecj,t − pbecej,t−1)j∈h,DB
∑ ati,ti∈h,i∉DB
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1. Introduction 
For many [pension] schemes unhedged interest rate and inflation sensitivity are the 
biggest risks they're running within their investment portfolio.  
– John Belgrove, senior partner of Aon Hewitt, Professional Pensions, 20 March 2014 – 
 
The sharp fall in interest rates during the period 2008 to 2012 has resulted in a USD 460 
billion increase in the liabilities of corporate defined benefit (DB) pension plans in the United 
States (Investment Company Institute (2014)). According to J.P. Morgan (2015), the interest 
rate risk of DB pension plans ranks among the top ten “striking facts” that firms should 
consider by setting their corporate finance strategies for 2015. This paper empirically 
examines whether capital markets are aware of the interest rate sensitivity of DB plans by 
studying whether the interest rate exposure of the sponsoring firm reflects the duration gap 
between the firm’s pension assets and liabilities. It is not obvious that markets process 
pension information without bias. Pension assets and liabilities are reported off-balance sheet 
and held separately from the firm’s operating assets, which could prevent that capital markets 
fully recognize the risk of DB pension plans.  
The efficiency of capital markets with respect to pension plan risk is controversially 
discussed in the academic literature. While Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) find that capital 
markets recognize the systematic risk (beta) of pension plans without bias, Franzoni and 
Marín (2006) show that equity markets underestimate the financial risk from pension 
shortfalls. 
Besides its relevance for the hypothesis of efficient capital markets, our research also 
contributes to a better understanding of the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial firms. With 
the notable exceptions of Sweeney and Warga (1986) and Bartram (2002), most of the 
existing research on interest rate exposures concerns financial firms (e.g., Flannery and James 
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(1984), Bae (1990), Madura and Zarruk (1995), and Memmel (2011)). We believe that the 
main reason for this limitation lies in the great difficulty to assess the interest rate sensitivity 
of the operating activity of nonfinancial firms. Changes in interest rates simultaneously affect 
operating cash flows, cost of capital, investment decisions, and the firm’s competitive position 
relative to other firms (Bartram (2002)). The joint effect of these channels of influence on 
firm value predominantly depends on the specific business model characteristics of the firm 
and its competitors (Bartram (2002)). Since these factors are mostly unobservable, an 
empirical prediction of the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial firms is quite difficult. Our 
paper investigates the interest rate sensitivity of corporate DB pension plans. That sensitivity 
is one component of the firm’s overall interest rate exposure that can be measured with 
publicly available information. 
Based on the considerations about the relation between systematic firm risk and 
systematic pension risk in Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we show formally that there should 
be a one-to-one relation between the systematic interest rate risk of the pension plan and the 
interest rate exposure of the sponsoring firm. We determine the systematic interest rate risk of 
pension plans by the difference between the duration of pension assets and the duration of 
pension liabilities. Our estimation approach is comparable to the calculation of systematic 
pension risk by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006). Our measure of the firm’s interest rate 
exposure is the sensitivity of stock returns to shifts of the yield curve (i.e., the firm’s equity 
duration). 
We test our prediction of a one-to-one relation between the firm’s interest rate exposure 
and the systematic interest rate risk of its pension plan with a panel of 224 nonfinancial U.S. 
COMPUSTAT firms that sponsor DB pension plans. We cover the years from 2003 to 2012 
(1,195 firm-years). Our sample excludes firms whose pension plans might hedge their interest 
rate risk with derivatives. Unobserved hedging would substantially distort our estimate of the 
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duration gap between pension assets and liabilities. Such distortions would make it difficult to 
tell whether deviations from the theoretical relation between the interest rate exposure of the 
firm and the systematic interest rate risk of the pension plan stem from market inefficiencies 
or simply from measurement error.  
In agreement with the hypothesis that capital markets are informationally efficient, we 
present evidence that the firm’s interest rate exposure reflects the pension duration gap 
without bias. Moreover, we show that this is no different for firms with heavily underfunded 
pension plans. Hence, our results are consistent with efficient capital markets but in 
contradiction with Franzoni and Marín (2006), who argue that capital markets overvalue the 
equity of firms with deficits in their pension funding. 
We test the robustness of our results in different ways. We cannot find that the relation 
between interest rate exposure and pension duration gap crucially depends on our assumptions 
about the duration of pension assets and liabilities. Similarly, we cannot find that our results 
are distorted by firms with negligibly small pension plans. Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) 
expect that pension risk has no first-order impact on equity returns of firms with small 
pension responsibilities. Furthermore, the relation between interest rate exposure and pension 
duration gap is not driven by firms in financial distress. Possibly, distressed firms 
simultaneously reduce their operating interest rate risk and the interest rate risk of their 
pension plans. Rauh (2009) shows that distressed firms reduce their pension risk to lower the 
expected cost of bankruptcy. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) find that distressed firms 
increase risk hedging in general. At last, our results are robust to the financial crisis and the 
subsequent period of low interest rates. Bartram (2002) shows that both the direction and the 
magnitude of corporate interest rate exposures are sensitive to different periods in time. 
Our paper adds to a long tradition of research about the impact of DB pension plans on 
the value of the sponsoring firm. Most notably, this includes Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and 
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Seligman (1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), and Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987). 
Furthermore, we contribute to the existing work of Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006). They find 
that stock returns reflect the systematic risk of DB pension plans. We show that capital 
markets also recognize the systematic interest rate risk of DB plans, which represents a 
specific risk factor that has not yet been fully understood in the context of nonfinancial firms. 
Thus, we also contribute to the comparably scarce literature on interest rate exposures of 
nonfinancial firms (e.g., Sweeney and Warga (1986) and Bartram (2002)). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of U.S. corporate pension plans. Section 3 discusses the theoretical relation 
between the interest rate exposure of the firm and the systematic interest rate risk of the 
pension plan. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
presents the results and their discussion. Last, section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional background 
Firms in the United States can choose between two types of retirement saving 
instruments – defined benefit (DB) plans and defined contribution (DC) plans. In a DB plan, 
the firm guarantees the employees specific and unconditional benefits upon retirement. This 
commitment represents a debt-like liability for the firm (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). 
Since 1974 firms are obligated by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
to guarantee their pension liabilities with assets in a segregated account. Whenever these 
assets are insufficient to cover the liabilities, the pension plan is underfunded, the firm must 
cover the deficit with deficit-reducing contributions (Rauh (2006)). Additionally, the firm 
must cover the discounted value of the pension benefits that have accrued during the current 
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fiscal year (Rauh (2006)).
14
 When a firm fails to meet its mandatory contributions, the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) is entitled to recover the outstanding amount 
by filing a claim against the firm. In a bankruptcy case, the PBGC claim has the most senior 
status (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). 
The firm’s responsibility in the case of DC plans is fundamentally different. When 
sponsoring a DC plan, the firm is simply committed to pay regular and fixed contributions to 
the employees’ retirement accounts. Upon retirement, the employees receive whatever 
amount of money (contributions plus interest) has accumulated on their behalf. The 
uncertainty about the level of retirement benefits is borne entirely by the employees. The firm 
faces no further obligation besides that of the regular contributions (Shivdasani and 
Stefanescu (2010)). Consistent with previous research, including Rauh (2006), Jin, Merton, 
and Bodie (2006), Franzoni and Marín (2006), and Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012), 
we exclude DC plans from our analysis. Throughout this paper we consequently use the terms 
pension plan and defined benefit pension plan interchangeably. 
 
3. Theoretical considerations 
Pension assets and liabilities are recorded off-balance sheet in the footnotes of 10-K 
annual statements (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). Nevertheless, firms are fully 
economically responsible for the risk of their pension plans. Firm and pension plan form a 
consolidated entity (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). Accordingly, financial analysts and 
rating agencies (e.g., Credit Suisse (2011) and Smyth (2013)) adjust their estimates of firm 
value by the values of pension assets and liabilities. There is also a large body of literature 
showing that the market value of pension sponsoring firms reflects the values of their pension 
assets and liabilities. Representative studies include Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and Seligman 
                                                 
14
 Rauh (2006) and Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2012) provide a detailed discussion on mandatory 
pension contributions. 
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(1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987), and Carroll and 
Niehaus (1998).  
Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) extend this literature by showing that stock returns not 
only reflect the values of pension assets and liabilities but also their systematic risk. They 
derive the following relation between the systematic risk of equity (βE), the systematic risk of 
operating assets (βOA), the systematic risk of debt (βD), the systematic risk of pension assets 
(βPA), and the systematic risk of pension liabilities (βPL): 
 
βEj =
OAj
Ej
βOAj −
Dj
Ej
βDj + [
PAj
Ej
βPAj −
PLj
Ej
βPLj] , (1) 
 
where OAj is the value of operating assets, Ej is the value of equity, Dj is the value of 
debt, PAj is the value of pension assets, and PLj is the value of pension liabilities of firm j. 
The systematic risk of equity (βEj) is the equity beta from the Sharpe (1964) capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), which implies that a firm’s stock return (REj) in excess to the risk 
free rate (RF) is given by 
 
REj − RF = αj + βEj(REM − RF) + ϵj , (2) 
 
where REM is the return on an equity market index (a proxy for the return on the market 
portfolio), αj is an intercept, and ϵj represents an error term. All returns are continuously 
compounded. Equation (1) shows that a firm’s CAPM beta is positively related to the firm’s 
systematic pension risk, which is represented by the expression in brackets.  
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A substantial part of the systematic risk of corporate DB pension plans consists of 
systematic interest rate risk that stems from the duration mismatch between pension assets 
and pension liabilities (Cornett and Saunders (2008) and Adams and Smith (2009)). To 
analyze the reflection of the pension duration gap in the stock returns of the sponsoring firm, 
we decompose the CAPM beta from equation (2) into a pure equity market risk component 
and a pure interest rate risk component. We do so following Stone (1974). In that APT model, 
a firm’s stock return (REj) is modeled as 
 
REj = αj + β′EjREM + γEjRBM + ϵj , (3) 
 
where REM is the continuously compounded return on an equity market index and RBM 
is the continuously compounded return on a debt market index. β′Ej and γEj measure the 
responsiveness of stock returns to movements of the equity and debt market, respectively. 
Stone (1974) shows that the CAPM beta from equation (2) is a combination of the equity and 
interest rate risk component from equation (3), namely 
 
βEj = β′Ej + γEj
Cov(RBM,REM)
Var(REM)
= β′Ej + γEjβI . (4) 
 
If we analogously decompose the betas in equation (1) and solve the expression for the 
systematic interest rate risk of equity (γEj), we obtain 
 
γEj =
OAj
Ej
γOAj −
Dj
Ej
γDj + [
PAj
Ej
γPAj −
PLj
Ej
γPLj] , (5) 
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where γOA is the systematic interest rate risk of operating assets, γD is the systematic 
interest rate risk of the firm’s debt, γPA is the systematic interest rate risk of pension assets, 
and γPL is the systematic interest rate risk of pension liabilities. We henceforth refer to γE as 
the interest rate exposure of the firm, which is consistent with the terminology in Bartram 
(2002). The derivation of equation (5) is shown in Appendix A. 
Provided that capital markets process the relevant information on systematic interest 
rate risk of pension plans without bias, equation (5) implies a one-to-one relation between the 
firm’s interest rate exposure (γE) and the systematic interest rate risk of its pension plan 
(γPension), namely 
 
γEj = γPensionj +
OAj
Ej
γOAj −
Dj
Ej
γDj , (6) 
 
with  
 
γPensionj =
PAj
Ej
γPAj −
PLj
Ej
γPLj . (7) 
 
In the next section, we discuss our empirical strategy to test whether equation (6) holds 
in practice. 
 
4. Regression specification and variable construction 
4.1. Regression model 
The linearity of equation (6) enables us to test the relation between the firm’s interest 
rate exposure (γEj) and the systematic interest rate risk of its pension plan (γPensionj) with 
the linear regression 
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γEj,T = 𝑎j + 𝑎T + 𝑏γPensionj,T + 𝚪′𝐗𝐣,𝐓 + ϵj,T , (8) 
 
where 𝑏 represents the sensitivity of the firm’s interest rate exposure to the systematic 
interest rate risk of the pension plan, 𝑎j and 𝑎T identify firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively, 𝚪′𝐗𝐣,𝐓 measures the firm’s time variant nonpension interest rate risk, and ϵj,T is a 
stochastic error term. If capital markets process the information about the interest rate risk of 
pension plans without bias, b has to equal one in magnitude. 
 
4.2. Interest rate exposure of the firm 
Consistent with previous research, including Flannery and James (1984), Sweeney and 
Warga (1986), Bae (1990), and Bartram (2002), we specify the firm’s interest rate exposure as 
an economic exposure. However, while these studies estimate interest rate exposure as the 
sensitivity of stock returns to changes in a specific interest rate, we estimate it as the 
sensitivity of stock returns to a change in the entire yield curve. The reason is that pension 
liabilities and pension asset classes have different maturity structures and are thus unequally 
sensitive to changes in interest rates of different maturities. A measure that only reflects one 
specific interest rate would not capture the entire interest rate risk of pension plans.  
We estimate the sensitivity of stock returns to changes in the 1-year, 5-year, 10-year, 
and 30-year default-free yield to maturity, while controlling for the return on a broad equity 
market index. In analogy to Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we run the following regression 
for each firm j and year T based on weekly CRSP data (up to 52 observations): 
 
REj,t = αj + β′EjREMt + γE1j∆I1,t + γE5j∆I5,t + γE10j∆I10,t + γE30j∆I30,t + ϵj,t , (9) 
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where REj,t is the continuously compounded total stock return of firm j in week t, αj is an 
intercept, REMt is the continuously compounded total return on the CRSP value-weighted 
U.S. stock market index in week t, and ∆I1,t, ∆I5,t, ∆I10,t, and ∆I30,t measure the weekly 
change in the continuously compounded yield to maturity of the 1-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year 
CRSP fixed term index in week t, respectively. β′Ej measures the responsiveness of stock 
returns to movements of the equity market. The coefficients γE1j, γE5j, γE10j, and γE30j 
denote the sensitivity of equity returns to a ceteris paribus change in the 1-, 5-, 10-, and 30-
year yield to maturity, respectively. The sum of these partial interest rate sensitivities 
(γ̂Ej = γE1j + γE5j + γE10j + γE30j)  represents the interest rate exposure of the firm. Since 
this measure determines the sensitivity of stock returns to shifts in the yield curve, it meets the 
standard textbook definition of modified duration. 
 
4.3. Systematic interest rate risk of the pension plan – the pension duration gap 
Consistent with the estimation of the firm’s interest rate exposure in the previous 
section, we empirically specify the systematic interest rate risk of pension assets and liabilities 
by their duration statistics. Our estimate of the systematic interest rate risk of pension plans 
(γ̂Pension) in equation (7) thus reflects the difference between the duration of pension assets 
and the duration of pension liabilities, weighted by the value of pension assets and liabilities, 
respectively, and normalized by firm equity. Henceforth, we refer to γ̂Pension as the duration 
gap between pension assets and liabilities.  
The empirical specification of the pension duration gap requires that we make 
assumptions about the duration of pension liabilities and the duration of pension asset classes. 
In accordance with Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we assume that the pension liability 
duration is 13, which reflects the interest rate sensitivity of a 30-year government bond 
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portfolio. This assumption is in line with Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011), who estimate the 
average pension liability duration at 13 as well, but base their estimation on detailed 
information on the actual maturity structure of the benefits of a sample of public pension 
plans. 
Based on the pension asset classes in our data set, which we discuss in section 5, we 
estimate a firm’s pension asset duration as the value-weighted average duration of the assets 
invested in bonds, equities, and real estate. According to Adams and Smith (2009), the 
duration of the bond portfolio of a representative pension plan is 6, while the duration of the 
equity portfolio is 0. The assumption about bond duration corresponds to the modified 
duration of a broad bond market index, e.g., the Barclays Global Aggregate Bond Index 
(Barclays (2014)). The equity duration assumption is consistent with our estimate of the 
average equity duration of COMPUSTAT firms in section 5.3. There is little agreement in the 
literature on the duration of real estate portfolios of pension plans. Estimates range from 0 to 
over a 100 (Hartzell, Shuhnan, Langetieg, and Leibowitz (1988), Chen and Chan (1989), and 
Chaney and Hoesli (2010)). In our main specification, we assume a real estate duration of 6, 
which equals our assumption about the duration of bond portfolios. In section 6.2 on the 
robustness of our results to the duration assumptions, we show that our results are however 
robust to real estate duration assumptions from 0 to 100. 
Based on equation (7), aforementioned duration assumptions, and in analogy to the 
estimation of systematic pension risk by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we define the pension 
duration gap of firm j in year T by  
 
γ̂Pensionj,T = PAj,T (
0 × equitiesj,T − 6 × bondsj,T − 6 × real estatej,T
Ej,T
) − PLj,T (
−13  
Ej,T
) , (10) 
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where equitiesj,T, bondsj,T , and real estatej,T represent the fraction of pension assets of firm 
j that are invested in these asset classes at year T. Ej,T is the current year market value of the 
firm’s equity, PAj,T is the market value of pension assets, and PLj,T is the actuarial value of 
pension liabilities. The duration statistics (-6 and -13) carry a negative sign because they 
represent negative interest rate sensitivities. 
Following the terminology in Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011), our pension duration 
gap measure represents a gross (pre-hedging) exposure of the net pension plan value to 
changes in the interest rate. This measure differs across firms and over time because of 
differences in asset allocation, in pension funding status, and in size of the pension plan 
relative to the equity of the sponsoring firm. The assumptions we made about asset class and 
liability duration are constant over time and do not vary between firms. 
 
4.4. Control variables 
The control variables in the regression equation (8) should represent the term 
OA
E
γOA −
D
E
γD  in equation (6), i.e., the fraction of the variation in corporate interest rate exposures that 
is caused by the interest rate sensitivity of operating assets and debt. Following the empirical 
specification of the test of the relation between systematic firm risk and systematic pension 
risk in Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), we use a series of proxies. 
We proxy the term −
D
E
γD by the ratio of short-term book value of debt to market value 
of equity and the ratio of long-term book value of debt to market value of equity. We expect 
that the firm’s interest rate exposure increases with these ratios. This is because the interest 
rate sensitivity of debt (γD) is negative and multiplied by minus one in the expression −
D
E
γD. 
Moreover, since long-term debt has a higher duration than short-term debt, we expect that the 
coefficient on long-term debt to equity exceeds the coefficient on short-term debt to equity. 
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As for the interest rate risk of the operating business (
OA
E
γOA), Bartram (2002) argues 
that changes in interest rates simultaneously affect operating cash flows, cost of capital, 
investment decisions, and the competitive position of the firm relative to other firms. We 
proxy for these effects by controlling for the cash flow to assets ratio and the natural 
logarithm of the book value of assets (Firm size). Our reasoning is that interest rate 
exposures are significantly related to cash flows (Bartram (2002)) and that firm size could 
serve as a very general proxy for a firm’s business model and competitive position. 
Finally, our regression model (8) includes firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the 
one-year lag of interest rate exposure. Firm fixed effects control for firm specific differences 
in interest rate exposures that remain constant over time, e.g., industry effects. Year fixed 
effects allow controlling for macroeconomic effects that affect all firms in a similar way. The 
one-year lag of interest rate exposure controls for firm specific trends and shifts in interest 
rate exposures. All variable definitions are in Table 9 of Appendix B. 
 
5. Data 
5.1. Data source 
Our sample builds on data from the COMPUSTAT North American Pension database, 
the COMPUSTAT/CRSP Merged database, the CRSP daily fixed term index files, and the 
CRSP daily stock files. The COMPUSTAT database contains firm level reporting data based 
on 10-K annual statements.  
The FASB requires that pension assets be measured by their market value, while 
pension liabilities have to be estimated as the actuarial present value of the promised benefits. 
The rate at which firms discount their pension liabilities has to reflect current interest rate 
levels (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) and Carmichael and Graham (2012)). There are two 
common definitions of a firm’s pension liability – the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO) and 
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the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO). While the ABO is defined as the present value of 
the benefits on the assumption that the pension plan is to be terminated immediately, the PBO 
additionally reflects the estimated remaining service life of employees, their projected salary 
increases, and their mortality rates. Since the issuance of FAS 87 in 1985, pension assets and 
pension liabilities are disclosed in the footnotes of annual financial statements. The general 
obligation to disclose the ABO ended in 1998. Even though the ABO is the most accurate 
measure of the economic value of pension liabilities (Bodie (1990)), it is potentially affected 
by a selection bias. We therefore quantify pension liabilities by the PBO measure in most of 
our analysis. This approach is in line with recent studies on corporate pension plans, including 
Franzoni and Marín (2006), Campbell, Dhaliwal, and Schwartz (2010), Campbell, Dhaliwal, 
and Schwartz (2012), and An, Huang, and Zhang (2013). Nevertheless, we show that our 
results remain virtually unchanged if we measure the pension liabilities by the ABO measure 
instead. 
 
5.2. Sample selection 
We limit our sample to nonfinancial firms, remove observations from foreign firms with 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and exclude firm-years with incomplete information 
on the relevant firm and pension accounting data (firm assets, firm debt, pension assets, 
pension asset allocation and PBO). We also exclude observations where the market value of 
equity is missing or the firm’s stock has not been traded in more than 43 weeks of the year. 
The estimated betas of firms that are infrequently traded are not meaningful. Furthermore, we 
exclude observations where the previous year interest rate exposure is missing. 
The sample period starts in 2003 because the information on pension asset allocations is 
not available for previous years. FAS 132 (R) requires that firms disclose pension assets along 
the categories equities, bonds, real estate, and other. The residual category other includes all 
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assets that are not equity, bond, or real estate investments (COMPUSTAT (2004)). 
Consequently, this includes derivative positions held for interest rate hedging purposes. We 
exclude firms that report a partial allocation of their pension assets to other assets. 
Unobserved derivative hedging would make it impossible to determine whether deviations 
from the theoretical relation between the pension duration gap and the firm’s interest rate 
exposure stem from market inefficiencies or simply from an inability to measure the duration 
gap correctly. This leaves us with a sample of 224 firms and 1,195 firm-years.  
 
5.3. Descriptive sample statistics 
The first three panels of Table 1 show the summary statistics for our sample of pension 
sponsoring firms from 2003 to 2012. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percent level of their pooled distribution to eliminate outliers. Panel A displays our main 
variables. Panel B shows additional pension plan characteristics. Panel C shows the 
characteristics of the firms in our sample. In Panel D, we additionally display these firm 
characteristics for a broad sample of pension and nonpension COMPUSTAT firms. This 
sample consists of both financial and nonfinancial firms that satisfy the nonpension selection 
criteria from the previous section. 
The median interest rate exposure in our sample is 0.97, which suggests that the equity 
value of the average sample firm increases by 1 percent in reaction to an upward shift of the 
yield curve by one percentage point. Stated differently, the median equity duration of our 
sample firms is approximately -1. The median interest rate exposure of our broad sample of 
COMPUSTAT firms (Panel D) is 0.22, which is close to our assumption that the average 
duration of a broadly diversified equity portfolio is 0. In section 6.2, we show that our results 
are virtually unaffected if we assume that the duration of equity portfolios is -0.22. 
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Despite the fact that interest rate exposures almost neutralize on average, they differ 
substantially between firms. In our pension firm sample, they range from -58.6 to 63.2. The 
average pension duration gap (normalized by firm equity) amounts to 3.19 if we measure 
pension liabilities by the PBO and 3.22 if we measure pension liabilities by the ABO instead. 
The 90
th
 percentile is 7.3 (PBO) and 7.5 (ABO), respectively. The smaller number of 
observations in the case of the ABO duration gap (954 vs. 1,195 in the case of the PBO 
measure) reflects the fact that, as mentioned above, firms are not generally required to report 
the ABO. The positive minimum values of 0.025 (PBO) and 0.018 (ABO) illustrate that the 
duration gap is strictly positive, which implies that the duration of pension liabilities is always 
higher than the duration of pension assets. 
The average ratio of pension liabilities (PBO) to firm assets is 0.16. This compares to an 
average financial leverage of 0.27, which documents the relative importance of pension plans 
as a corporate liability. On average, only 76 percent of the PBO is backed by pension assets, 
which indicates that the average pension plan is substantially underfunded. The average 
pension asset allocation is dominated by equity investments (60 percent). Fixed income 
securities only account for 39 percent and real estate investments for 1 percent of the average 
pension asset allocation. The predominant allocation of pension assets to equities represents 
the main reason for the distinct positive duration gap of corporate DB pension plans in the 
U.S. While the duration of pension liabilities is 13 (Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)), the 
duration of diversified equity portfolios is 0 (Adams and Smith (2009)). 
The descriptive statistics of the firm characteristics show that our sample consists of an 
average set of COMPUSTAT firms. Based on the comparison of the median values, we find 
that the average firm in our pension sample has a higher cash flow to asset ratio and is slightly 
larger and more leveraged than the average COMPUSTAT firm. However, such a bias is 
55 
 
common in studies on corporate DB pension plans and in line with previous studies (e.g., 
Rauh (2006) and Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 2 reports the pairwise Pearson correlations between selected variables. The 
correlation between the pension duration gap and the interest rate exposure is positive, 
statistically significant and almost identical for both pension duration gap measures. This 
represents first, univariate evidence of the recognition of the pension duration gap by capital 
markets. Similarly, the ratios of short-term and long-term debt to equity are significantly 
positively correlated with the firm’s interest rate exposure. The control variables for the firm’s 
operating interest rate risk are not significantly related to interest rate exposure. They are, 
however, significantly correlated with both the PBO and the ABO based duration gap 
measure. The high correlation (0.997) between these two measures of the interest rate 
sensitivity of pension plans indicates that the pension liability definition might be of little 
consequence to our analysis.  
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we empirically test whether the relation between interest rate exposure 
and pension duration gap, which we have identified under the assumption of efficient capital 
markets, also holds in practice. 
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6.1. Main results 
In this section, we empirically study the relation between the firm’s interest rate 
exposure and the pension duration gap. We run regressions based on different specifications 
of equation (8). All regressions are controlled for firm and year fixed effects. The statistical 
significance of the coefficients is determined based on a two-tailed test with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. Table 3 displays the results. The p-value at the bottom of the table 
refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension duration gap equals 
one. 
In the first two columns, we run regression of interest rate exposure on pension duration 
gap and our proxies for the interest rate sensitivity of firm debt (short-term and long-term debt 
to equity). In these analyses, the variation in a firm’s operating interest rate risk is reflected in 
the error term. In the second two columns, we display the results of regressions that include 
our entire set of control variables from section 4.4. We measure pension liabilities by the PBO 
in Columns (1) and (3) and by the ABO in Columns (2) and (4). For both duration gap 
measures, and regardless of whether we include our proxies for the firm’s operating interest 
rate risk, the coefficient on pension duration gap is significantly larger than zero and not 
statistically different from one. These results support our prediction of a one-to-one relation 
between interest rate exposure and pension duration gap and are therefore consistent with the 
hypothesis that capital markets are informationally efficient. Considering our control 
variables, we find that interest rate exposure is significantly related to cash flows, firm size, 
and the one-year lag interest rate exposure. In line with Bartram (2002), who shows that the 
statistical relation between interest rate exposure and financial leverage is weak, we can not 
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find that the firm’s interest rate exposure is significantly affected by the short-term and long-
term debt to equity ratio, respectively.
15
 
In Columns (5) and (6), we test for the robustness of our results to the proxies that are 
used by Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006) to control for systematic risk (CAPM beta) of 
operating assets. Possibly, these factors might explain the systematic interest rate risk of 
operating assets as well. These additional controls include the percentage of industry total 
sales that is earned by the firm (Market share), the capital intensiveness of the firm’s 
operating business, cash holdings divided by total assets (Cash position), the growth rate of 
asset (Growth rate), the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Liquidity), the ratio of 
research and development expense to assets, and the ratio of advertising expense to assets. We 
provide detailed definitions of these variables in Table 9 of Appendix B. For both the PBO 
and the ABO based duration gap measure, the coefficient is positive and statistically not 
different from one. None of the coefficients on the proxies for systematic risk is significantly 
different from zero. In our further analyses, we thus rely on our original regression 
specification in section 4. 
The impact of the pension duration gap on the interest rate exposure of the sponsoring 
firm is also of economic significance. Based on the coefficients estimated in Column (3), a 
one standard deviation increase in the duration gap (6.0) leads to a rise in the interest rate 
exposure (equity duration) of the firm by 7.6 (0.2 standard deviations). 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
In the next step of our analysis, we address the concern of Franzoni and Marín (2006) 
that capital markets overvalue the equity of firms with large deficits in their pension funding. 
                                                 
15
 If we control for financial leverage instead of short-term and long-term debt to equity, we receive a 
similar result (not tabulated). 
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We do so by sorting our sample along the pension funding ratio and repeating our analysis for 
different groups of firms whose pension liabilities are the most severely underfunded. The 
funding ratio is the ratio of pension assets to PBO. Table 4 reports the results for the PBO 
based duration gap measure. Our findings do not change if we alternatively measure pension 
liabilities by the ABO (not tabulated). Columns (1) to (4) show the estimates for four 
alternative subsamples where we keep 80, 60, 40, and 20 percent of the firms with the most 
underfunded pension plans, respectively. In all regressions, the duration gap coefficient is 
significantly positive but statistically not different from one. These results indicate that capital 
markets are informationally efficient with respect to the systematic interest rate risk of 
pension plans regardless of their funding status. 
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
6.2. Robustness to the duration assumptions 
Figure 1 considers the robustness of our findings to our assumptions about the duration 
of pension assets and liabilities. Graph A shows the duration gap coefficient as a function of 
the pension liability duration assumption. Graphs B, C, and D display the estimate as a 
function of the assumption about the duration of pension assets invested in bonds, equities, 
and real estate, respectively. We measure pension liabilities by the PBO. However, the shapes 
of the graphs are unaffected if we alternatively measure pension liabilities by the ABO. 
For pension liabilities, the literature mentions both longer and shorter duration 
assumptions than the 13 we use. Ryan and Fabozzi (2002) and Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) 
assume that the duration of state and local pension liabilities is 15. Mercer (2014) estimates 
the average duration of corporate pension liability at 17, Jared Gross, a former chief financial 
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economist at the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), arrives at an estimate of 12 
(Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006)). Graph A plots the coefficient on the pension duration gap for 
an assumed pension liability duration from 10 to 20. A liability duration of 12 is associated 
with a duration gap coefficient of 1.41; a duration of 15 yields an estimate of 1.09; and a 
liability duration of 17 results in a coefficient of 0.95. None of these values is significantly 
different from one. 
The impacts of bond, equity, and real estate duration assumptions are comparably small 
as well. If we set the bond duration at 18, which implies that pension plans uniquely invest in 
bonds with maturities over 20 years (Barclays (2014)), the duration gap coefficient takes a 
value of 1.71. If we assume that the entire fixed income portfolio is invested in cash 
equivalents (duration of 0), we obtain a point estimate of 1.12. Both estimates are statistically 
not different from one.  
For equity securities, we test for both positive and negative duration statistics. 
Leibowitz (1986) argues that equity durations could also be negative. Graph C plots the 
pension duration gap coefficient as a function of equity durations between -20 and 6. We set 
the upper level of equity duration at 6 because we believe it is highly unlikely that equity 
portfolios have a higher duration than broadly diversified bond portfolios. The lower level 
(-18) reflects a reduction of our main equity portfolio duration assumption (0) by one standard 
deviation of the equity duration of COMPUSTAT firms in Table 1. The resulting point 
estimates range from 0.77 (equity duration of -18) to 1.58 (equity duration of 6). They are 
never statistically different from 1. If we assume that the equity duration equals the median 
equity duration of our sample of COMPUSTAT firms in Table 1 (-0.22), the coefficient on 
the pension duration gap takes a value of 1.27, which is virtually identical to the estimate of 
1.28 in Column (1) of Table 3. 
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In section 4.3, we show that the literature mentions duration assumptions for real estate 
portfolios between 0 and 100. Though this reflects a considerable uncertainty about the 
duration of real estate investments, it does not compromise our analysis as the duration gap 
coefficient is virtually insensitive to changes in the assumed real estate duration. The duration 
gap coefficient is 1.28 if we assume that real estate has a duration of 0. In comparison, it takes 
a value of 1.27 if we set real estate duration to 100. The reason why the duration gap 
coefficient is almost insensitive to the assumption about the duration of real estate 
investments is that real estate only accounts for a small fraction of the average pension asset 
allocation.  
Altogether, the results in this section indicate that our findings are robust to the 
assumptions about the duration of pension liabilities and pension asset classes. 
 
[insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
6.3. Robustness to negligibly small pension responsibilities 
For some firms in our sample, the size of the pension plan is small compared to the size 
of the sponsoring firm. The pension duration gap might therefore not have a first-order impact 
on equity returns of these firms. According to Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), these 
observations are not likely to add information to the analysis, which could dilute the fit of our 
regressions to estimate the true relation between pension duration gap and interest rate 
exposure. We address this concern by repeating our analysis for different subsamples of firms 
with comparably large pension plans. We measure the size of pension plans by both the ratio 
of pension liabilities (PBO) to book value of firm assets and the pension duration gap. 
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Table 5 displays the results. In Columns (1) and (2), we exclude firm-years, where the 
ratio of PBO to firm assets is smaller than the 10
th
 and 20
th
 percentile of the pooled 
distribution, respectively. Similarly, Columns (3) and (4) report the results for a sample of 
firm-years where the pension duration gap is larger than in 10 and 20 percent of the 
observations, respectively. In all regressions, the coefficient on the pension duration gap 
(PBO) is positive and not statistically different from one. We receive a similar result if we 
measure pension liabilities by the ABO (not tabulated). We thus conclude that our results are 
not distorted by firms with negligibly small pension plans. 
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
 
 
6.4. Robustness to financial distress 
This section considers whether our results could be driven by financial distress of the 
pension sponsoring firms. According to Rauh (2009), financially distressed firms try to reduce 
the expected cost of bankruptcy by allocating a larger portion of pension assets to bonds, 
which implies a reduction of the pension duration gap. Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) 
find that distressed firms increase their hedging activities in general. The positive relation 
between the pension duration gap and the interest rate exposure of the sponsoring firm might 
therefore be caused by financially distressed firms that simultaneously reduce the interest rate 
risk of their business and their pension plan. We test for this potential bias by examining the 
relation between pension duration gap and corporate interest rate exposure for different 
subsamples of nondistressed firms only. We use the same indicators of financial distress as 
Jin, Merton, and Bodie (2006), namely book to market value, return on investment, and 
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financial leverage.
16
 In each sample year, we exclude either the decile or the quintile of firms 
that appear to be most severely financially distressed the year before. These are the firms with 
the highest book to market ratio, the highest financial leverage, and the lowest return on 
investment, respectively.
17
 In total, we consider six different subsamples of non-distressed 
firms. 
Table 6 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) sort the firms by their book to market 
value, Columns (3) and (4) by return on investment, and Columns (5) and (6) by financial 
leverage. In all regressions, the pension duration gap (PBO) coefficient is positive and not 
statistically different from one. In not tabulated regressions, we receive a similar result for the 
ABO based pension duration gap measure. These results indicate that the relation between 
interest rate exposure and duration gap is not caused by financial distress of the sponsoring 
firms. 
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
6.5. Robustness to the sample period 
Our sample period (2003 to 2012) covers a fairly dynamic interest rate environment 
characterized by large macroeconomic disturbances, central bank interventions, and a massive 
decrease in interest rates. Bartram (2002) finds that the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial 
firms differs considerably between different periods in time. This raises the concern that our 
results could heavily depend on our observation period. Therefore, we estimate the relation 
between duration gap and interest rate exposure for different subperiods of our sample. First, 
                                                 
16
 The definitions are given in Table 9 of Appendix B. 
17
 The value of the 10
th
 percentile of return on investment is negative in all sample years. The value of the 
20
th
 percentile is negative in the majority of the years. 
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we test whether our results are driven by the recent financial crisis. Second, we compare the 
pension duration gap coefficient in high interest rate periods with the estimate in a low 
interest rate period. Table 7 displays the estimates of regressions on the PBO based duration 
gap measure. However, we receive similar results if we measure pension liabilities by the 
ABO (not tabulated).  
In Column (1), we exclude the year 2008, when Lehman brothers filed for bankruptcy 
and global stock markets collapsed. In Column (2), we further exclude the year 2007, when 
the first manifestations of a liquidity crisis took place, and 2009, when the stock market 
bottomed out and started to recover. In Columns (3) and (4), we split the sample into years 
with comparably high interest rate levels (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008) and years with 
comparably low interest rate levels (2003, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012). In all regressions, we 
find a positive pension duration gap coefficient that is not statistically different from one. This 
indicates that our findings are persistent over time and do not depend on a specific 
macroeconomic environment. 
 
[insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
6.6. Out of sample analyses 
In this last section of our paper, we investigate the relation between interest rate 
exposure and pension duration gap in two alternative samples of pension sponsoring firms. 
Table 8 displays the results. Column (1) considers nonfinancial firms with pension plans that 
potentially hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives. As we discuss in section 5.2, these 
represent the firms that report a partial allocation of their pension assets to other assets. The 
duration gap coefficient in this sample is significantly negative, which conflicts with our 
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prediction that, under the assumption of market efficiency, the estimate should be equal to 
one. However, as we argued before, we cannot rule out that this result is due to unobserved 
derivative hedging. We therefore believe that this evidence is not sufficient to reject the 
hypothesis of efficient capital markets.  
Column (2) displays the estimates for financial firms with pension plans that do not 
hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives. Although the coefficient on pension duration 
gap is negative, it is not significantly different from one. This is because the standard error is 
approximately six times as large as in our main sample of nonfinancial pension sponsoring 
firms. Thus, we cannot reject the market efficiency hypothesis based on this sample either. 
 
[insert Table 8 here] 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial firms is related 
to the systematic interest rate risk of their pension plans, and whether the relation is one-to-
one. The interest rate sensitivity of DB pension plans is among the biggest nonoperating risks 
of corporate America. Based on publicly available information and controlling for other 
factors that potentially affect interest rate exposures, we find that equity returns reflect the 
duration gap between pension assets and liabilities without bias – even in cases where 
previous research has questioned market efficiency. Our finding is economically important 
and robust to the assumptions about the duration of pension assets and liabilities. Moreover, 
our analysis is not distorted by negligibly small pension plans, financial distress of the 
sponsoring firms, or changes in the macroeconomic environment. 
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This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion about the efficiency of capital markets 
with respect to information about DB pension plans. We extend this literature to systematic 
interest rate risk, which represents a risk factor that has not yet been fully understood in its 
impact on nonfinancial firms. Therefore, we also contribute to the comparatively limited 
literature on the interest rate exposure of nonfinancial firms. 
Since our data do not provide us with information on derivative hedging in corporate 
DB pension plans, we limit our main analysis to firms whose pension plans do not invest in 
derivative securities at all. Still, we cannot exclude that these firms hedge the interest rate risk 
of their pension plans on their own accounts. However, even if this was the case, it could not 
explain our findings. On the contrary, it would rather weaken the relation between pension 
duration gap and interest rate exposure of the firm. Future research might have access to more 
comprehensive data on interest rate hedging and might therefore be able to test the relation 
between pension duration gap and interest rate exposure of the sponsoring firm in a larger 
sample of firms. 
 
Appendix A: Derivation of the equations in section 3 
If we decompose βOA, βD, βPA and βPL in analogy to equation (4) into their equity and 
their interest rate risk components, we can rewrite equation (1) by 
 
β′
Ej
+ γEj ∙ βI =
OAj
Ej
(β′
OAj
+ γOAj ∙ βI) −
Dj
Ej
(β′
Dj
+ γDj ∙ βI)  
 + [
PAj
Ej
(β′
PAj
+ γPAj ∙ βI) −
PLj
Ej
(β′
PLj
+ γPLj ∙ βI)] . (A1) 
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Rearranging the expression yields 
 
β′
Ej
+ γEj ∙ βI =
OAj
Ej
β′
OAj
−
Dj
Ej
β′
Dj
+ [
PAj
Ej
β′
PAj
−
PLj
Ej
β′
PLj
]  
 +
OAj
Ej
γOAj ∙ βI −
Dj
Ej
γDj ∙ βI + [
PAj
Ej
γPAj ∙ βI −
PLj
Ej
γPLj ∙ βI] , (A2) 
 
which we decompose into an interest rate risk part  
 
γEj ∙ βI =
OAj
Ej
γOAj ∙ βI −
Dj
Ej
γDj ∙ βI + [
PAj
Ej
γPAj ∙ βI −
PLj
Ej
γPLj ∙ βI] (A3) 
 
and an equity risk part 
 
β′
Ej
=
OAj
Ej
β′
OAj
−
Dj
Ej
β′
Dj
+ [
PAj
Ej
β′
PAj
−
PLj
Ej
β′
PLj
] . (A4) 
 
If βI ≠ 0, we can divide equation (A3) by βI, which yields an interest rate risk 
expression analogous to the expression for systematic risk in equation (1): 
 
γEj =
OAj
Ej
γOAj −
Dj
Ej
γDj + [
PAj
Ej
γPAj −
PLj
Ej
γPLj]  (5) 
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Appendix B: Tables and figures 
Table 1: Descriptive sample statistics 
This table shows the descriptive sample statistics of our main variables.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 
2003 to 2012.  In Panels A, B, and C, the sample is restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not 
hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives. The sample in Panel D consists of both pension and nonpension COMPUSTAT 
firms.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
 Mean Median Min 10th %ile 90th %ile Max Std. N 
Panel A: Main Variables 
Interest rate exposure 1.903 0.974 -58.597 -16.469 22.523 63.194 18.051 1,195 
Pension duration gap (PBO) 3.187 1.307 0.025 0.207 7.313 42.674 5.912 1,195 
Pension duration gap (ABO) 3.220 1.299 0.018 0.221 7.459 42.504 6.023 954 
Panel B: Pension plan characteristics 
Pension liabilities (PBO) to firm assets 0.157 0.106 0.005 0.017 0.351 0.896 0.167 1,195 
Funding ratio 0.758 0.757 0.184 0.527 0.978 1.492 0.199 1,195 
Asset allocation to equities (in %) 59.855 62.000 0.000 42.000 74.000 99.040 15.455 1,195 
Asset allocation to bonds (in %) 39.116 37.000 0.960 24.300 56.600 100.000 15.534 1,195 
Asset allocation to real estate (in %) 1.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000 12.016 2.633 1,195 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Financial leverage 0.271 0.249 0.000 0.014 0.515 0.941 0.199 1,195 
Short-term debt to equity 0.069 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.137 1.830 0.221 1,195 
Long-term debt to equity 0.579 0.242 0.000 0.000 1.342 7.855 1.096 1,195 
Cash flow to assets 0.078 0.082 -0.418 -0.008 0.179 0.329 0.098 1,195 
Book value of firm assets (in $m) 4,570 1,501 27 164 13,494 55,746 8,778 1,195 
Panel D: Characteristics of COMPUSTAT firms 
Interest rate exposure 0.667 0.217 -59.993 -18.477 20.728 61.925 18.325 21,510 
Financial leverage 0.230 0.194 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.907 0.198 21,510 
Short-term debt to equity 0.202 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.440 5.163 0.657 21,510 
Long-term debt to equity 0.608 0.230 0.000 0.000 1.359 8.939 1.246 21,510 
Cash flow to assets 0.057 0.063 -0.510 -0.021 0.160 0.377 0.113 21,510 
Book value of firm assets (in $m) 9,381 1,387 10 96 19,125 227,097 29,171 21,510 
 
Table 2: Pearson correlation matrix 
This table shows the pairwise Pearson correlations between selected variables.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data 
refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not hedge their 
interest rate risk with derivatives.  The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10% level using a two-tailed test.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Interest rate exposure 1       
(2) Pension duration gap (PBO) 0.1531* 1      
(3) Pension duration gap (ABO) 0.1566* 0.9974* 1     
(4) Short-term debt to equity 0.0483* 0.4493* 0.4746* 1    
(5) Long-term debt to equity 0.1151* 0.4877* 0.5006* 0.3442* 1   
(6) Cash flow to assets -0.0139 -0.3548* -0.3711* -0.3375* -0.3487* 1  
(7) Firm size -0.0341 -0.0833* -0.0902* -0.0760* 0.0547* 0.1804* 1 
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Table 3: The relation between interest rate exposure and the pension duration gap 
This table reports the results of our main regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit 
pension plans that do not hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level 
using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.  The p-value at the bottom of the table 
refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension duration gap equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Pension duration gap (PBO) 0.775**  1.283***  1.417***  
 (0.354)  (0.308)  (0.284)  
Pension duration gap (ABO)  0.864**  1.319***  1.295*** 
  (0.370)  (0.314)  (0.313) 
Short-term debt to equity -10.774 -12.641 -8.523 -9.284 -10.282 -11.133 
 (9.132) (12.017) (9.156) (11.785) (9.950) (12.046) 
Long-term debt to equity 0.839 0.225 0.866 0.116 -0.365 0.024 
 (1.898) (1.803) (2.030) (1.947) (1.732) (1.815) 
Cash flow to assets   40.235*** 39.416** 40.491*** 41.571** 
   (13.080) (15.881) (14.537) (16.966) 
Firm size   7.461** 7.047** 10.132*** 8.840** 
   (3.050) (3.375) (3.388) (3.891) 
Lag interest rate exposure   -0.146** -0.144** -0.157*** -0.148** 
   (0.058) (0.072) (0.059) (0.073) 
Market share (in %)     -23.353 -28.237 
     (18.976) (20.070) 
Capital intensiveness     0.667 1.700 
     (17.379) (20.085) 
Cash position     16.199 11.252 
     (16.383) (19.593) 
Growth rate     -0.193 -1.371 
     (5.283) (6.129) 
Liquidity     -0.873 -1.635 
     (1.132) (1.474) 
Advertisement to assets     11.036 -80.366 
     (55.474) (118.091) 
R&D to assets     48.034 78.839 
     (79.347) (76.313) 
       
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1'195 954 1,195 954 1,168 938 
R2 adjusted 0.074 0.074 0.116 0.114 0.118 0.112 
p-value (b = 1) 0.526 0.713 0.360 0.310 0.143 0.347 
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Table 4: Impact of the pension funding ratio 
This table reports the results of regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls for firms with low 
pension funding.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that 
sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives.  All variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% 
(**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.  The p-value at 
the bottom of the table refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension duration gap equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
Include the Pth percentile of 
observations with the lowest funding 
ratio 
P = 80 P = 60 P = 40 P = 20 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pension duration gap (PBO) 1.231*** 1.104** 1.392*** 1.561*** 
 (0.312) (0.501) (0.516) (0.485) 
Short-term debt to equity -12.170 -9.642 2.153 18.984 
 (10.258) (10.998) (22.074) (11.996) 
Long-term debt to equity 1.257 2.247 2.627 2.217 
 (2.267) (2.635) (2.834) (3.762) 
Cash flow to assets 33.140** 21.202 15.772 21.269 
 (16.372) (20.057) (25.139) (32.541) 
Firm size 5.710 8.593* 6.849 6.949 
 (3.668) (4.435) (5.307) (8.397) 
Lag interest rate exposure -0.172** -0.204** -0.181 -0.342** 
 (0.068) (0.085) (0.125) (0.157) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 956 717 478 239 
R2 adjusted 0.114 0.140 0.062 0.288 
p-value (b = 1) 0.459 0.836 0.449 0.250 
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Table 5: Robustness to negligibly small pension responsibilities 
This table reports the results of regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls excluding firms 
with negligibly small pension responsibilities.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The 
sample is restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not hedge their interest rate risk with 
derivatives.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are clustered at the firm level.  The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the 
coefficient on the pension duration gap equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
Include observations where 
PBO to firm assets >   Pension duration gap (PBO) > 
10th percentile (1.7%) 20th percentile (3.1%) 10th percentile (0.21) 20th percentile (0.38) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pension duration gap (PBO) 1.132*** 1.202*** 1.231*** 1.247*** 
 (0.334) (0.355) (0.325) (0.308) 
Short-term debt to equity -7.020 -6.197 -8.187 -9.272 
 (9.924) (11.179) (9.260) (9.567) 
Long-term debt to equity 1.576 0.468 0.830 0.141 
 (2.392) (2.518) (2.083) (1.763) 
Cash flow to assets 38.931*** 38.077*** 39.241*** 32.746** 
 (14.203) (14.416) (13.729) (14.411) 
Firm size 4.862 4.745 4.584 4.350 
 (3.243) (3.495) (3.167) (3.630) 
Lag interest rate exposure -0.137** -0.142** -0.144** -0.150** 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.065) (0.070) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1,076 956 1,076 956 
R2 adjusted 0.107 0.133 0.110 0.097 
p-value (b = 1) 0.693 0.569 0.478 0.424 
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Table 6: Robustness to financial distress 
This table reports the results of regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls excluding firms 
that are potentially financially distressed.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is 
restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm 
level.  The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension 
duration gap equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
Measure of financial distress  Book to market ratio   Return on investment   Financial leverage 
In each year, exclude the Pth 
percentile of the most financially 
distressed firms the year before 
10 20 10 20 10 20 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Pension duration gap (PBO) 1.001** 1.024* 1.087*** 1.049* 1.294*** 1.344*** 
 (0.467) (0.578) (0.404) (0.584) (0.296) (0.288) 
Short-term debt to equity -10.435 -8.731 -14.834* -10.526 -18.620** -13.112 
 (12.566) (14.855) (8.228) (9.420) (8.431) (8.806) 
Long-term debt to equity 2.059 0.635 0.435 -0.320 1.081 1.212 
 (2.073) (2.206) (2.213) (2.290) (1.993) (3.111) 
Cash flow to assets 38.844*** 44.222** 50.766*** 44.206*** 39.128*** 38.060** 
 (14.471) (18.245) (13.669) (14.954) (13.828) (14.955) 
Firm size 5.881* 7.259** 7.206** 6.975** 6.833** 5.836* 
 (3.059) (3.261) (3.251) (3.266) (3.321) (3.290) 
Lag interest rate exposure -0.152** -0.187*** -0.140** -0.144** -0.136** -0.162*** 
 (0.062) (0.071) (0.056) (0.065) (0.062) (0.060) 
       
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,078 959 1,079 960 1,078 959 
R2 adjusted 0.108 0.110 0.123 0.138 0.105 0.130 
p-value (b = 1) 0.998 0.968 0.829 0.933 0.321 0.234 
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Table 7: Robustness to financial crisis 
This table reports the results of regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls for different 
macroeconomic environments.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted 
to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that do not hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives.  All variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% 
(***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.  The 
p-value at the bottom of the table refers to a two-tailed Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension duration gap 
equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
Included years All ex 2008 All ex. 2007 to 2009 2004 to 2008 2003 and 2009 to 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pension duration gap (PBO) 1.152*** 0.925** 0.683** 1.269** 
 (0.307) (0.428) (0.300) (0.563) 
Short-term debt to equity 2.730 -5.157 -6.946 1.278 
 (5.874) (11.459) (8.807) (17.533) 
Long-term debt to equity 3.166*** 4.792* 0.940 1.761 
 (0.805) (2.613) (1.712) (3.552) 
Cash flow to assets 43.418*** 39.255** 22.594** 52.495 
 (9.588) (19.956) (11.116) (35.020) 
Firm size 7.646*** 6.618* 1.917 10.934* 
 (1.837) (3.648) (3.840) (6.046) 
Lag interest rate exposure -0.166*** -0.188*** -0.284*** -0.204* 
 (0.038) (0.063) (0.054) (0.105) 
     
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 1'077 964 605 590 
R2 adjusted 0.121 0.188 0.252 0.061 
p-value (b = 1) 0.633 0.861 0.293 0.633 
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Table 8: Out of sample analyses 
This table reports the results of regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls for financial firms 
and firms with pension plans that likely hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives, respectively.  Variable definitions are 
in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
distribution.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using a two-tailed test.  
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level.  The p-value at the bottom of the table refers to a two-tailed 
Wald test of whether the coefficient on the pension duration gap equals one. 
Dependent variable Interest rate exposure 
Sample 
Nonfinancial firms with plans that potentially hedge with 
derivatives 
Financial firms with plans that do not hedge with 
derivatives 
 (1) (2) 
   
Pension duration gap (PBO) -0.171** -1.993 
 (0.078) (1.888) 
Short-term debt to equity 3.285 -3.485 
 (3.248) (2.197) 
Long-term debt to equity 0.071 -0.194 
 (0.624) (1.826) 
Cash flow to assets 15.024*** -14.297 
 (5.176) (20.295) 
Firm size -0.999 -4.744 
 (1.202) (4.247) 
Lag interest rate exposure -0.146*** -0.185 
 (0.021) (0.118) 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 7,296 426 
R2 adjusted 0.082 0.048 
p-value (b = 1) 0.000 0.117 
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Table 9: Variable definitions 
This table summarizes the variable definitions.  The data are from the from the COMPUSTAT North American Pension 
database, the COMPUSTAT/CRSP Merged database, the CRSP daily fixed term index files, and the CRSP daily stock files. 
Variable  Calculation (incl. COMPUSTAT mnemonics) 
 Panel A: Main variables 
Interest rate exposure (γ̂E) The interest rate exposure of the firm’s equity is the sum of the partial sensitivities of stock returns to absolute 
changes in the yield to maturity of the 1-, 5-, 10- and 30-year CRSP fixed term index, while controlling for the return 
on the CRSP value-weighted total stock market index. 
The regression run is: REj,t = αj + β′Ej ∙ REMt + γE1j∆I1,t + γE5j∆I5,t + γE10j∆I10,t + γE30j∆I30,t + ϵj,t 
The estimation is made for each firm and year based on weekly CRSP data (up to 52 observations). All returns are 
continuously compounded. We exclude stocks that have not been traded for more than 43 weeks during a year. 
γ̂Ej = γE1j + γE5j + γE10j + γE30j 
Pension duration gap (γ̂Pension) The pension duration gap is the difference between the duration of pension assets (normalized by the ratio of 
pension assets to firm equity) and the duration of pension liabilities (normalized by the ratio of pension liabilities to 
firm equity). 
The duration of pension assets is the weighted average duration of pension assets invested in equities (pnate), 
bonds (pnatd), and real estate (pnatr). 
Pension assets are measured by their market value (pplao+pplau). Pension liabilities are primarily measured by the 
PBO (pbpro + pbpru). In an alternative specification, pension liabilities are measured by the ABO (pbaco + pbacu). 
The duration assumptions are: 
Duration Pension liabilities  = 13 
Duration equities  = 0 
Duration bonds  = 6 
Duration real estate  = 6 
Pension duration gap (PBO) = (
(0 ∙ pnate − 6 ∙ pnatd − 6 ∙ pnatr)(pplao+pplau)−(−13(pbpro+pbpru))
100(csho ∙ prcc_f)
)  
Pension duration gap (ABO) = (
(0 ∙ pnate − 6 ∙ pnatd − 6 ∙ pnatr)(pplao+pplau)−(−13(pbaco +pbacu))
100(csho ∙ prcc_f)
) 
 Panel B: Control variables 
Short-term debt to equity Book value of short-term debt (dlc) divided by market value of equity (csho x prcc_f). 
Long-term debt to equity Book value of long-term debt (dltt) divided by market value of equity (csho x prcc_f). 
Cash flow to assets Sum of net income and depreciation and amortization (ni + dp) divided by total assets (at). 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets (at). 
Market share (in %) Sales (sale) divided by total sales of firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry multiplied by hundred. 
Capital intensiveness Current assets (act) divided by total assets (at). 
Cash position Cash and short-term investments (che) divided by total assets (at). 
Growth rate Natural logarithm of total assets divided by lagged total assets (ln(at / att-1)). 
Liquidity Current assets (act) divided by current liabilities (lct). 
Advertisement to assets Advertising expense (xad) divided by total assets (at). If advertising expense is missing it is set to zero. 
R&D to assets Research and development expense (xrd) divided by total assets (at). If research and development expense is 
missing it is set to zero. 
 Panel C: Further variables 
PBO to firm assets The PBO (pbpro + pbpru) divided by total assets (at). 
Funding ratio Pension assets (pplao + pplau) divided by the PBO (pbpro + pbpru). 
Book-market ratio Book value of equity (at-dlc-dltt) divided by market value of equity (csho x prcc_f). 
Return on investment Net income (ni) divided by total assets (at). 
Financial leverage Book value of debt (dltt + dlc) divided by total assets (at). 
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Figure 1: Coefficient on pension duration gap as a function of the duration assumptions 
This figure plots the coefficient on the pension duration gap as a function of the assumption about the duration of pension 
assets and liabilities.  We run regressions of interest rate exposure on pension duration gap and controls, including year and 
firm fixed effects. We measure pension liabilities by the PBO.  The set of control variables includes short-term debt to equity, 
long-term debt to equity, cash flow to assets, firm size, and the one-year lag of interest rate exposure.  Variable definitions are 
in Table 9.  The data refer to 2003 to 2012.  The sample is restricted to firms that sponsor defined benefit pension plans that 
do not hedge their interest rate risk with derivatives.  Graph A displays the duration gap coefficient as a function of the 
pension liability duration assumption, Graphs B, C, and D plot the estimate as a function of the assumption about the duration 
of pension assets invested in bonds, equities, and real estate, respectively.  All variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled distribution.  Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
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Pension liability duration 
Graph A: Sensitivity to the pension liability duration assumption 
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Bond duration 
Graph B: Sensitivity to the bond duration assumption 
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Equity duration 
Graph C: Sensitivity to the equity duration assumption 
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Graph D: Sensitivity to the real estate duration assumption 
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1. Introduction 
Failure to take account of the mismatch between the assets in defined benefit pension 
plans (primarily equities) and the liabilities (deferred fixed annuities) has long been a major 
unrecognized source of financial instability. The underfunding problems now facing state and 
local government pension plans […] are a direct consequence of this conceptual and 
practical failure. 
– Zivi Bodie (2012), International Journal of Central Banking – 
 
The vast majority of public defined benefit (DB) pension plans in the U.S. are 
substantially underfunded. In 2013, the asset value of the 126 largest public DB pension plans 
equaled USD 2.86 trillion, while the reported pension liabilities amounted to USD 3.81 
trillion (Public Fund Survey (2015)). The economic value of pension obligations was even 15 
to 40 percent higher (Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011)). In most states of the U.S., the deficit in 
pension funding is larger than the general obligation debt and equals several years of tax 
revenues (Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011)). The shortfall in public pension funding has also 
been a major contributor to some of the most recent bankruptcies of U.S. cities, including 
Detroit (IL), Harrisburg (PA), Mammoth Lakes (CA), Stockton (CA), and Central Falls (RI) 
(Spangler (2013)). Unfunded public pension liabilities are thus a huge burden on tax payers. 
Moreover, these shortfalls imply that future generations of taxpayers must pay for today’s 
pension liabilities, which violates the fundamental principle of public finance that each 
generation should pay for the services it consumes (Bader (2015)). 
The main cause of the underfunding problems of public pension plans is the historic 
mismatch between pension assets and liabilities (Bodie (2012)). According to Pennacchi and 
Rastad (2011), this asset-liability mismatch determines the total financial risk of a DB pension 
plan. Despite the far-reaching consequences of this risk, we know little about its determinants 
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(Bodie (2012)). Existing research, including Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012), 
Baxamusa and Jalal (2015), and Cain and McKeon (2015) shows that the risk of listed firms is 
explained by the private preferences of corporate executives. This paper investigates if 
pension risk is partially explained by the personal preferences of pension executives as well. 
We focus on the chairman of the board (COB) because the chairperson represents the pension 
executive with the strongest influence on asset-liability decisions. While the chief investment 
officer (CIO) is involved in the everyday management of pension assets, the COB is the 
president of the board that effectively determines investment allocations, actuarial valuations, 
system operations, and often plan benefits (Mitchell (2001)). The pension COB is comparable 
to a corporate chairman with his superior access to new information and his substantial 
influence on meeting agendas and committee decisions (Parker (1990)).
18
  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to inquire into whether the individual 
preferences of the COB explain pension risk. Existing empirical studies typically rely on 
pension plan or board characteristics to explain risk taking at pension plans but largely ignore 
the possible role of individual executives. Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) show that pension 
risk increases with the fraction of beneficiaries on the pension board of trustees, possibly 
because beneficiaries have an incentive to gamble for higher benefits. Park (2009), Weller and 
Wenger (2009), and Mohan and Zhang (2014) present evidence that pension managers tend to 
follow trends and peer group norms in their risk taking decisions. There is also a wide 
literature on moral hazard of pension managers, which argues that public pension accounting 
rules allow managers to manipulate the value of the pension liabilities and the amount of 
required pension contributions (e.g., Lucas and Zeldes (2009), Pennacchi and Rastad (2011), 
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011), and Mohan and Zhang (2014)).  
Our estimation of the risk from mismatched pension assets and liabilities closely 
follows the method suggested by Pennacchi and Rastad (2011). Thus, we define pension risk 
                                                 
18
 If not stated differently, masculine pronouns refer to women and men alike. 
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by the volatility of the return difference between pension assets and liabilities. We find that 
pension assets are generally poorly matched to pension liabilities. On average, pension risk 
therefore even exceeds the volatility of equity market returns. We test whether the personal 
risk preferences of COBs affect the risk of the plans they are responsible for based on four 
empirical predictions derived from the literature. (1) Pension risk is negatively affected by an 
increase in COB age, (2) pension risk is lower if the COB is a woman, (3) pension risk is 
higher if the COB is an annuitant (retiree of the plan), and (4) pension risk is higher if the 
COB is a politician (ex officio trustee). 
According to a substantial body of literature in finance and economics, including 
Campbell (2006), Serfling (2014), and Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014), risk taking is 
decreasing with an individual’s age. We therefore predict that pension risk is negatively 
affected by an increase in the COB’s age. 
There is also a large literature on gender specific differences in risk attitudes, which 
mostly finds that women are intrinsically less risk loving than men (Apicella, Dreber, 
Campbell, Gray, Hoffman, and Little (2008), Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri (2009), and 
Croson and Gneezy (2009)). Two notable exceptions are Adams and Funk (2012) and Berger, 
Kick, and Schaeck (2014), who show that female board members of large, listed firms seek 
higher levels of risk than their male counterparts. Adams and Funk (2012) explain this finding 
by the personal costs of women who choose a career that eventually leads to a board seat. 
Women who decide to bear these costs are less tradition and security oriented than the 
average woman in the population (Adams and Funk (2012)). Another study deviating from 
the notion that women are universally less risk seeking than men is the survey of Jörg (2005). 
It shows that women are only more risk averse than men in investment type decisions but 
appear to be more risk loving than men in insurance situations. For public pension plans, 
however, we expect that female COBs are less risk loving than their male counterparts. This is 
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because we cannot observe that the women in our sample face a trade-off between family and 
career as they are often rank and file employees of the pension sponsor. Furthermore, existing 
empirical evidence on risk taking in personal retirement accounts indicates that women prefer 
lower levels of pension risk than male account holders (Sundén and Surette (1998) and 
Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003)). 
Our prediction that pension risk is higher if the COB is an annuitant of the pension plan 
is based on the fact that payments to retirees are upward flexible, while at the same time they 
are downside protected (Monahan (2010)). Such optionality creates an incentive to speculate 
for higher benefits by increasing the risk of the pension plan (Pennacchi and Rastad (2011)). 
Finally, we expect that pension risk is higher if the COB is an ex officio trustee. 
Politicians are not concerned about long-term funding issues because they operate under a 
relatively short time horizon (Giertz and Papke (2007)). Knowing that they will likely be gone 
from office when a potential pension underfunding problem becomes critical, they will rather 
reduce public pension contributions than raise taxes or cut programs, (Giertz and Papke 
(2007)). The preference of politicians for low pension contributions entails a preference for 
high pension risk because pension accounting rules allow public pension sponsors to reduce 
their contributions by choosing a riskier asset allocation (Lucas and Zeldes (2009), Pennacchi 
and Rastad (2011), Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011), and Mohan and Zhang (2014)). 
We test our empirical predictions in a difference-in-difference (DID) analysis. The DID 
estimator compares the pension risk in a treatment group to the pension risk in a control group 
both before and after treatment. It allows controlling for omitted variables that affect both 
groups in a similar way or remain constant over time (Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014)). In 
this study, the treatment group consists of observations where the COB risk preferences 
change in the current fiscal year. Board-years with no contemporaneous change in COB 
preferences form the control group. We address the concern that pension trustees might 
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simultaneously decide on the risk of the pension plan and appoint a COB who matches their 
risk preferences by considering a reduced sample of pension plans where COB changes are 
exogenous. 
We test our empirical predictions with data from the Public Plans Database (PPD)  of 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College (2015), which covers 90 percent of the 
pension members and assets of state and local DB plans in the U.S. Our initial sample covers 
the years from 2001 to 2013 and consists of 1,310 observations about 110 pension boards of 
trustees. We then hand collected information on COBs from over 2,000 public information 
sources and personal contacts with the pension plans. We obtained complete COB 
information for 1,159 observations of our initial sample (88 percent). This sample covers 343 
changes of chairpersons. 
Our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that pension risk reflects the 
personal risk preferences of the COB. Pension risk is negatively affected by an increase in 
COB age, lower if the COB is a woman, higher if the COB is an annuitant, and higher if the 
COB is an ex officio trustee. We do not find that COBs are appointed by the board of trustees 
based on their personal attitude towards pension risk. However, we find evidence that pension 
risk is predominantly affected by COB risk preferences if pension governance is weaker. We 
consider a plan as more weakly governed if decisions on pension risk are not made by a 
separate and professionalized investment board. This finding is consistent with Cronqvist, 
Makhija, and Yonker (2012), who shows that CEOs primarily align the risk of the firm with 
their personal risk preferences when corporate governance is poor. 
Our main contribution is that we are the first to present evidence that the personal risk 
preferences of pension COBs are a predictor of public pension plan risk. Since pension risk is 
the main driver of today’s substantial funding shortfalls, taxpayers should be wary of who is 
in charge of the pension plans in their community. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of 
the public pension system in the U.S. In Section 3, we derive our empirical predictions and 
discuss the relevant literature. In Section 4, we describe the sample selection and how we 
measure pension risk. In Section 5, we discuss our empirical strategy. In Section 6, we present 
the results and their discussion. Last, we conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Public pension plans in the U.S. 
While many firms in the U.S. have moved away from DB plans and opened defined 
contribution (DC) retirement schemes such as 401(k) plans instead, the public sector has seen 
very limited movement in this direction (Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011)). In 2014, total public 
DC assets (USD 533 billion) only amounted to 15 percent of state and local DB assets (USD 
3.6 trillion) (Hoops, Stefanescu, and Vidangos (2015)). In a DB plan, the employer guarantees 
its employees specific benefits upon their retirement. If pension assets prove to be insufficient 
to cover these benefits, the sponsor has to make additional contributions. Therefore, DB plans 
represent a financial risk to their sponsors. This risk increases with the mismatch between 
pension assets and liabilities (Pennacchi and Rastad (2011)). The sponsor’s responsibility 
under DC plans is fundamentally different. It only consists of the sponsor’s commitment to 
pay regular and fixed contributions to the employees’ retirement accounts. At retirement, the 
employees receive whatever amount of money (contributions plus interest) has accumulated 
on their behalf. The uncertainty about the level of retirement benefits lies entirely with the 
employees (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)). We therefore exclude these retirement 
schemes from our analysis, which is consistent with previous research on public pension risk 
(e.g., Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) and Mohan and Zhang (2014)). Throughout this paper, we 
consequently use the terms pension plan and defined benefit pension plan interchangeably. 
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3. Literature review and empirical predictions 
Recent empirical evidence shows that corporate executives imprint their private risk 
preferences on the firms they manage. Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) find that CEOs 
align the corporate capital structure with their preference for leverage. Cain and McKeon 
(2015) show that firms have a higher equity return volatility if the CEO possesses a private 
pilot’s license, which they consider a proxy for personal risk-taking. Baxamusa and Jalal 
(2015) find that firms issue more debt and are geographically and operationally less 
diversified if the CEO plays a risky sport. Based on this evidence, we expect that pension 
COBs align the risk of the plan with their personal attitudes towards risk as well. In our 
empirical analysis of the relation between COB risk preferences and pension risk, we test four 
predictions that have been suggested by the literature. The following sections discuss these 
predictions in detail. 
 
3.1. COB age 
A large body of literature identifies a negative relation between individual age and risk 
taking. Campbell (2006) finds that older households invest a lower fraction of their total 
wealth into equity securities than younger households. Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003) 
observe a similar pattern in over 7,000 401(k) accounts. In a survey among more than 500 
business executives, MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) document a negative relation 
between executive age and corporate risk taking as well. This is supported by recent empirical 
evidence. Serfling (2014) shows that stock return volatility is negatively affected by CEO age 
and Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) find that the risk of bank portfolios decreases with the 
fraction of older directors on the board. 
There are also studies that contradict the view of higher risk aversion among older 
executives. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that younger mutual fund managers are less risk 
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tolerant than their older colleges because they face a higher probability of being dismissed for 
poor performance. Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) show that inexperienced security 
analysts are conservative in their forecasts because they are more likely terminated for 
inaccurate forecasts that deviate from the consensus estimates than their more experienced 
counterparts. We do however not expect career concerns to have a first order impact on the 
personal risk preference of pension COBs. First of all, pension COBs are typically much older 
than managers and analysts of mutual funds, which makes it less likely that a onetime 
negative event destroys their reputation. While the average fund manager in Chevalier and 
Ellison (1999) is 44 of age, the mean age of our pension COBs is 57 years. Secondly, we 
cannot observe that past performance is of any consequence to pension COB replacements. 
Table 1 shows that the probability the COB is replaced after a year of relatively bad 
investment performance does not differ from the probability that he is replaced after a year of 
good performance. Past performance is also irrelevant for COB replacements if we only 
consider the 50 percent youngest or the 25 percent youngest COBs in our sample.
19
 We 
therefore predict that pension risk decreases with COB age. 
 
[insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
3.2. COB gender 
Studies on gender differences in risk attitudes mostly find that women prefer lower 
levels of risk than men (Croson and Gneezy (2009)). In their recent analysis of risk taking in 
banks, Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa (2014) document that female CEOs choose less risky 
capital structures (higher Tier 1 capital and higher equity capital) than men. Apicella, Dreber, 
                                                 
19
 We receive a similar result if we consider three years of past performance instead of one year. 
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Campbell, Gray, Hoffman, and Little (2008) and Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri (2009)) 
find that risk taking of individuals is increasing in their testosterone level. Dwyer, Gilkeson, 
and List (2002) and Jörg (2005) present evidence that the higher risk-aversion of women is 
explained by knowledge disparities. 
In contradiction to the notion of greater risk aversion among women, Adams and Funk 
(2012) and Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014) find that female directors of large, listed firms 
are more risk loving than male directors because the trade-off between having a family and 
choosing a career path that eventually leads to a board seat is more costly for women than for 
men. Women who choose career over family are less tradition and security oriented, and 
therefore less risk averse than their male counterparts. More risk loving women thus self-
select into the pool of eligible director candidates (Adams and Funk (2012)). In our sample of 
public pension COBs, career constraints are however not as evident as they are in case of 
directors of large corporations. The typical pension COB is selected from among the members 
of the board of trustees, which primarily consists of beneficiaries of the pension plan, which 
are often rank and file employees of the pension sponsor (Pennacchi and Rastad (2011)). In 
our sample, 72 of 99 female COBs (73 percent) are pension beneficiaries. The trade-off 
between family and career is likely small for these women. We thus expect that the selection 
bias discussed in Adams and Funk (2012) is not of first order relevance in our analysis. 
The second reservation to the notion that women are generally more risk averse than 
men is formulated by Jörg (2005). In a large survey of over 2,316 households, she observes 
that women are only more risk averse than men in investment type decisions but appear 
relatively more risk loving in insurance situations. Decisions on pension risk entail both an 
investment and an insurance component. From an investment perspective, higher pension risk 
is associated with a higher expected return on pension assets. From an insurance perspective, 
reducing pension risk without simultaneously reducing pension benefits requires that the 
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lower expected return on pension assets is compensated by higher pension contributions 
(Brown and Wilcox (2009)). These contributions represent an insurance premium. Which 
perspective on pension risk dominates is ultimately an empirical question. Empirical evidence 
on asset allocation decisions in personal retirement accounts indicates that women prefer 
lower levels of pension risk than men (Sundén and Surette (1998) and Agnew, Balduzzi, and 
Sundén (2003)). Based on these considerations, we predict that pension risk is lower if the 
COB is female. 
 
3.3. Annuitants 
Bulow and Scholes (1983), Bodie (1990), and Carroll and Niehaus (1998) show that 
beneficiaries of overfunded plans tend to bargain for higher benefit levels. Since the 
probability of future funding surpluses increases with the mismatch between pension assets 
and liabilities, Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) argue that beneficiary trustees have a preference 
for higher pension risk. However, this is only strictly the case for beneficiaries that are already 
retired (annuitants). Beneficiaries that are still working for the pension sponsor (actives) face 
the downside of higher pension risk as well. The reason is that an increase in pension risk also 
increases the probability of future funding shortfalls. Highly underfunded plans are allowed to 
reduce the level of future benefits (Monahan (2010)). Moreover, the sponsors of these plans, 
which are the employers of active beneficiaries, might have to cut wages and discharge 
employees because the deficit reduction contributions drain their financial resources. 
In contrast, the pension risk preferences of annuitants are not ambiguous. Benefits that 
are already earned (vested) are downside protected in most U.S. states (Monahan (2010)).
20
 
Furthermore, annuitants do not need to worry about their salaries or their jobs as they already 
retired. Since speculating for higher benefits comes at no personal costs for retirees, we 
                                                 
20
 An exception are Texas and Indiana, where past pension benefit levels are not legally protected 
(Monahan, 201 0). 
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expect annuitants to have a preference for high pension risk. We thus predict that pension risk 
is higher if the COB is an annuitant. 
 
3.4. Politicians 
According to the Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 25 (GASB 
25), public pension plans are allowed to discount pension benefits at the expected rate of 
return on pension assets. Since this rate reflects the risk of pension assets, higher pension risk 
reduces the actuarial value of pension liabilities and improves the pension funding status 
(Mohan and Zhang (2014)). Moreover, since the annual required contribution (ARC) of 
sponsors of underfunded plans depends on the extent of the underfunding (GASB 25), higher 
pension risk also enables a reduction in the ARC. Brown and Wilcox (2009) point out that the 
current funding deficits of public pension plans are partially explained by the lack of 
contributions due to artificially high discount rates. 
Politicians prefer to avoid unpopular decisions in the short-term, such as raising taxes or 
cutting social benefits (Giertz and Papke (2007)). Since riskier pension assets help justify a 
higher discount rate, which allows lower pension contributions, politicians have a personal 
incentive to increase the share of risky assets in the pension asset allocation, which increases 
the overall risk of the pension plan. When low contributions and high risk eventually 
materialize in underfunded pension liabilities, the politician who is responsible for the 
decision will likely be gone from office (Giertz and Papke (2007)). We therefore predict that 
pension risk is higher if the COB is an ex officio trustee. 
 
  
88 
 
4. Data and variable construction 
4.1. Sample selection 
Our main data source is the Public Plans Database (PPD)  of the Center for Retirement 
Research at Boston College (2015).
21
 The PPD contains data from Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports (CAFRs) of 150 state and local defined benefit pension plans. It covers 90 
percent of the pension members and assets of U.S. public DB plans for the years from 2001 to 
2013. We aggregate all plans where asset-liability risk decisions are made by the same board 
of trustees. This is to avoid double counting certain COB changes that affect several pension 
plans at the same time. With the sole exception of North Dakota, all plans that share the same 
(investment) board of trustees have also the same asset allocation.
22
 We then match the 
aggregated PPD data with hand collected information on the COB from more than 2,000 
public information sources, including CAFRs, CVs, company webpages, newspaper articles, 
obituaries, public records databases (intelius.com and dobsearch.com), and social networking 
services (linkedin.com and facebook.com). Furthermore, we personally contacted 53 pension 
boards where we could not gather all the information from public sources. In total, our data 
cover 1,503 observations among 116 pension boards of trustees.  
We limit our analysis to observations where complete accounting data are reported 
(asset value, asset allocation, liability value, number of beneficiaries, and number of 
annuitants). This reduces the number of observations by 112. It has however no effect on the 
number of boards in our sample. We further exclude pension plans where the board of trustees 
does not have full discretion over asset allocation decisions but receives risk targets by a 
separate pension administration board or delegates asset allocation decisions to a separate 
                                                 
21
 The data are publicly available at:  
http://publicplansdata.org/public-plans-database/download-full-data-set/ 
22
 In North Dakota, we only use the data for the largest system of the state, the North Dakota Public 
Employees Retirement System. 
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investment administration council.
23
 For these plans, it is unclear which authority is 
effectively responsible for asset-liability matching decisions. We do however not exclude 
plans where the board of trustees is complemented by a separate pension administration board 
if the administration board does not set explicit targets for the risk of plan assets.
24
 This leaves 
us with an initial sample of 1,310 observations among 110 pension boards (142 pension 
plans). We have complete COB information in 88 percent of these observations (1,159 board-
years). 
 
4.2. Measuring pension risk 
Our estimation of public pension risk closely follows the method suggested by 
Pennacchi and Rastad (2011), which defines the risk of plan i in year t as the volatility of the 
return difference between pension assets and pension liabilities (tracking error). 
 
Pension riski,t = 100 × √σA
2
i,t
+ σL
2
i,t
− 2ρALi,tσAi,tσLi,t , (1) 
 
where, σA
2
i,t
 is the variance of the pension asset returns of plan i in year t, σL
2
i,t
 is the 
variance of the relative change in the value of pension liabilities, and ρALi,t is the annual 
correlation between pension asset and pension liability returns. We multiply by 100 to obtain 
an expression in percentage points. 
                                                 
23
 This includes the Alaska Public Employees’ Retirement System and the Alaska Teachers’ Retirement 
System for the years 2001 to 2005, the North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System, the Oregon Public 
Employees Retirement System, the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, the Rhode Island Municipal 
Employees’ Retirement System, the South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority, the South Dakota 
Retirement System, and the Employees Retirement System of Texas. 
24
 This includes the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois, the Iowa Public Employees 
Retirement System, the Massachusetts State Employee Retirement System, the Massachusetts Teachers' 
Retirement System, the Minnesota State Retirement System, the Montana Public Employee Retirement 
Administration, the Montana Teachers' Retirement System, Nebraska Public Employees Retirement Systems, the 
North Dakota Public Employees Retirement System, the West Virginia Public Employees Retirement System, 
the West Virginia teachers’ Retirement System, the Wisconsin Retirement System, and the Los Angeles County 
Employees Retirement Association. 
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The variance of pension assets is defined by 
 
σA
2
i,t
= 𝛚′𝐢,𝐭𝛀𝛚𝐢,𝐭 , (2) 
 
where 𝛀 is the variance-covariance matrix of the asset class returns and 𝛚𝐢,𝐭 is the asset 
allocation vector of the pension plan i in year t. The PPD data provide us with asset allocation 
information along the categories equities, bonds, real estate, short-term securities, and 
alternative assets. Following Pennacchi and Rastad (2011), we estimate the variance-
covariance matrix based on monthly time series of asset class returns over our entire 
observation period (2001 to 2013). Equity returns are total returns of a composite of U.S. and 
international equities. Two thirds of this composite consist of the Vanguard Total Stock 
Market Index Fund (Institutional share class). The other third consists of the Vanguard Total 
International Stock Index Fund (Investor share class). This weighting corresponds to the 
average international diversification of equity securities of pension plans that separately report 
their allocations to U.S. and international equities. These plans are approximately half of the 
plans in our sample. Our bond composite consists of 90 percent the Merrill Lynch U.S. 
Corporate & Government Master Index and 10 percent the Merrill Lynch Global Broad 
Market ex US Dollar Index. As in the estimation of equity returns, this weighting reflects the 
average international diversification of fixed income investments of the plans in our sample. 
Real estate returns are the returns of the Vanguard REIT Index Fund (Investor share class), 
and short term security returns are the returns of the Vanguard Short-Term Investment-Grade 
Fund (Institutional share class). Finally, the return series for alternative investments reflects 
the equally weighted average returns of the Thomson Reuters Core Commodity CRB Total 
Return Index, the Thomson Reuters Private Equity Buyout Research Index, and the Thomson 
Reuters Venture Capital Research Index. Mohan and Zhang (2014) show that the risk of 
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alternative investments of public pension plans is best approximated by the equally weighted 
average risk of commodities, private equity, and venture capital. Some plans report a residual 
fraction of assets that is not assigned to any of the above asset classes. Following Pennacchi 
and Rastad (2011), we ignore these investments and proportionally increase the weights of the 
other asset classes. Since unassigned assets only account for one percent of the average asset 
allocation in our sample, the measurement error from this approximation is small. Our 
investment return estimates are indeed highly correlated with the actual investment returns 
reported by the pension plans. The correlation statistic is 0.92 for the entire sample (1,159 
board-years), 0.94 for pension plans that allocate more than 10 percent of their assets to 
alternative assets (395 board-years), and 0.88 for plans that report a positive allocation to 
other assets (247 board-years). 
The economic value of pension liabilities is the present value of expected future benefit 
payments. This value is sensitive to both interest rate changes and changes in the growth rate 
of government wages (Pennacchi and Rastad (2011)). Interest rates affect the rate at which 
pension benefits should be discounted. Changes in the wage growth affect future benefit 
payments because pension benefits are defined as a percentage of an employee’s last salary 
before retirement. Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) define the economic risk (variance) of 
pension liabilities by 
 
σL
2
i,t
= σLW
2
i,t
+ σLB
2
i,t
+ 2ρWBσLWi,tσLBi,t , (3) 
 
where σLWi,t measures the volatility of wage increases at plan i in year t, σLBi,t 
measures bond return volatility (interest rate risk), and ρWB is the correlation between wage 
increases and bond holding period returns over the entire observation period (2001-2013). 
Pennacchi and Rastad (2010) show that both wage and interest rate risk of pension liabilities 
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depend on the ratio of active (working) beneficiaries to total pension beneficiaries. 
Obligations to annuitants do not bear any wage risk because retirees cannot receive wage 
increases. Moreover, the interest rate risk (duration) of annuitant liabilities is lower than the 
interest rate risk of obligations to actives because annuitants have a shorter life expectancy 
than actives. Pension liability risk is therefore increasing in the ratio of active to total 
beneficiaries. In line with Pennacchi and Rastad (2010), we define the wage risk component 
of pension liability risk by 
 
σLWi,t = σW [
NEi,t
NEi,t+NAi,t
] (4) 
 
and the interest rate risk component by 
 
σLBi,t = σB [0.4 + 0.558 (
NEi,t
NEi,t+NAi,t
) + 0.0425 (
NEi,t
NEi,t+NAi,t
)
2
] , (5) 
 
where NEi,t is the number of active employees of plan i in year t, NAi,t is the number of 
annuitants, σW is the annualized volatility of quarterly changes in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2015) seasonally adjusted Employment Cost Index for State and Local Government 
Workers,
25
 and σB is the annualized volatility of the monthly holding period return of a 15-
year zero government bond. Both σW and σB are scalars that we estimate based on return 
information over our entire observation period. A detailed derivation of the nominal factors in 
equation (5) is provided in Pennacchi and Rastad (2010). 
According to Pennacchi and Rastad (2011), liabilities of public pension plans reflect 
nominal interest rate risk when the pension plan does not provide Cost of Living Adjustments 
                                                 
25
 The data are available at http://www.bls.gov/data/#wages 
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(COLAs) but reflect real interest rate risk when the plan provides COLAs. Therefore, we 
estimate two different versions of the interest rate risk of pension liabilities. The first is based 
on the nominal holding period return of a 15-year U.S. government bond from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon (USGOV15YZ). The second is based on the holding period return of a 15-year 
zero TIPS from Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2008).
26
 We thus also define two different 
estimates of public pension risk. The first (Nominal PR) reflects nominal interest rate risk in 
case of all pension plans. Our second pension risk measure (COLA adj PR) measures real 
interest rate risk if the pension plan reports that it adjusts pension benefits for changes in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI), and nominal interest rate risk otherwise. 
Table 2 displays the correlations and standard deviations of the return series we use to 
estimate public pension risk. The reported correlation statistics are consistent with the values 
from the return series used by Pennacchi and Rastad (2011). On the one hand, we find that 
equities, real estate, and alternative investments are highly correlated. On the other hand, the 
correlation of these asset classes with bond returns and wage growth is weak. Most 
intuitively, the correlation between bond portfolio returns and 15-year zero bond returns is 
high. The only asset class that is substantially correlated with wage increases is short term 
securities. During the years 2001 to 2013, 15-year zero bonds had a volatility of 0.151, while 
the standard deviation of equity securities was 0.109. This highlights the relative importance 
of interest rate risk during our observation period. 
 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
                                                 
26
 The data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2008/index.htm 
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5. Empirical strategy 
5.1. Regression model 
We assess the impact of COB risk preferences on pension risk in a difference-in-
difference analysis. The DID estimator compares the change in the risk of pension plans in the 
current and subsequent fiscal years in which the COB risk preferences have changed 
(treatment group) with the contemporaneous change in the risk of pension plans for which the 
risk preferences of the COB have not changed (control group). This enables to control for 
omitted variables that similarly affect the risk taking of the treated and the untreated group 
(Berger, Kick, and Schaeck (2014)). Moreover, it enables to control for unobserved pension 
plan characteristics that remain constant over time. We define our main regression equation in 
first difference (FD) form by 
 
∆ Pension riski,t =  𝛂t + 𝛃
′ ∙ ∆ 𝐂𝐎𝐁 𝐑𝐏i,t + 𝚪
′ ∙ ∆ 𝐗𝐂𝐎𝐁i,t + 𝚼
′ ∙ ∆ 𝐗𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧i,t  + ϵi,t , (6) 
 
where ∆ Pension riski,t is the change in the risk of the plans managed by board i from 
year t − 1 to year t. ∆ 𝐂𝐎𝐁 𝐑𝐏i,t represents a matrix of year-to-year changes in our set of 
COB risk preference measures, ∆ 𝐗𝐂𝐎𝐁 is a set of variables that controls for changes in other 
COB characteristics, and ∆ 𝐗𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 consists of controls for changes in pension plan 
characteristics. 𝛃′, 𝚪′, and 𝚼′ are vectors of coefficients, 𝛂t represents year fixed effects, and 
ϵi,t is a stochastic error term.  
Following our considerations in Section 3, the COB risk preference measures include 
changes in COB age (∆ COB age) and gender (∆ COB female), changes in the COB’s status 
as an annuitant of the plan (∆ COB annuitant), and changes in whether he is an ex officio 
trustee (∆ COB ex officio) or not. We define ∆ COB age as the difference between the age of 
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the new COB and the age of his predecessor in years. ∆ COB female, ∆ COB annuitant, and 
∆ COB ex officio represent changes in the respective COB characteristics. All of these 
variables take a value of one if the new COB exhibits the characteristic while the predecessor 
did not, a value of minus one if the new COB does not exhibit the characteristic while the 
predecessor did, and a value of zero otherwise. All COB variables take a value of zero if the 
COB does not change. Throughout our analysis, we allocate COB changes to the first fiscal 
year when the new COB presides the pension board for at least half of the fiscal year (six 
months). 
Based on our empirical predictions from Section 3, we expect a negative coefficient on 
∆ COB age and ∆ COB female and a positive coefficient on ∆ COB annuitant and 
∆ COB ex officio, respectively. 
 
5.2. Control variables 
The first variable in our set of COB controls (∆ 𝐗𝐂𝐎𝐁) is a binary variable (New COB) 
that identifies board-years where the COB has changed in the current fiscal year. We control 
for the COB change per se to distinguish between changes in pension risk that stem from the 
COB change alone and effects that reflect changes in COB risk preferences (treatment effect). 
Furthermore, we control for the change in a binary variable that indicates whether the COB is 
a beneficiary of the plan (∆ COB beneficiary). This is necessary to distinguish between a 
general preference of pension beneficiaries for higher pension risk, as suggested by Pennacchi 
and Rastad (2011), and our prediction that only annuitants prefer higher levels of pension risk. 
Finally, our set of pension plan controls includes the change in a binary variable that indicates 
whether the COB is financially literate (∆ Financial literacy). Existing research indicates that 
financial literacy matters in portfolio decisions. For instance, poorly educated households 
invest less in equity securities and avoid financial strategies for which they feel unqualified 
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(Campbell (2006)). We classify a COB as financially literate when he holds a Master’s degree 
or a PhD in economics, finance, or business administration, and/or is a Chartered Financial 
Analyst (CFA), a Certified Financial Planner (CFP), a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), or 
a Certified Public Financial Advisor (CPFA).
27
 
The first two variables in our set of pension plan controls (∆ 𝐗𝐏𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧) are the change in 
the previous year funding ratio (∆ Funding ratio−1) and the change in the previous year 
reported investment return (∆ Return−1). Rauh (2009) and Mohan and Zhang (2014) present 
evidence that pension risk is correlated with the previous period funding ratio and the 
previous period investment return because of either risk management or risk transfer 
incentives of pension managers. A risk management view implies that pension risk is 
positively affected by both previous year funding ratio and investment return because an 
increase in these variables increases the risk carrying capacity of the pension plan (Rauh 
(2009)). A risk transfer view on the other hand implies that pension risk is negatively affected 
by funding status and past return, respectively. This is because pension managers try to 
improve the funding ratio in the short run by raising the expected return on pension assets and 
shifting the risk to future tax payers (Mohan and Zhang (2014)). We estimate the funding 
ratio as the market value of assets divided by the value of pension liabilities. In line with 
Pennacchi and Rastad (2011), we measure pension liabilities by their actuarial value under 
GASB standards because pension plans do not report the fair, economic value of their 
liabilities. 
We also control for changes in the natural logarithm of pension assets (∆ Ln size). 
According to Mohan and Zhang (2014), larger pension plans enjoy economies of scale for 
transaction fees, which increases their incentive to invest in equity and alternative assets, 
which both lead to higher pension risk. Finally, we include year fixed effects to control for 
                                                 
27
 For 21 COBs in our main sample, we could not find any information about their education. We assume 
that those COBs do not fulfill our criteria of financial literacy. When we alternatively exclude these 
observations, our results remain virtually identical. 
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macro-economic effects that affect all pension plans in a similar way. Table 9 of the appendix 
provides detailed definitions of all the variables we use in this paper. 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for our sample of public pension plans from 2001 
to 2013. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percent level of their 
pooled distribution to eliminate outliers. Panel A displays descriptive statistics of selected 
pension plan and COB characteristics, Panel B does so for the first differences of our 
continuous pension variables, Panel C shows descriptive statistics of the changes in COB 
characteristics, and Panel D reports the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between 
changes in COB characteristics. 
The average nominal pension risk (Nominal PR) of the plans in our sample is 14.3 
percent; the average COLA adjusted pension risk (COLA adj PR) is 13.4. Pension risk 
therefore exceeds the volatility of a broadly diversified equity portfolio (10.9 percent) and 
corresponds to the volatility of alternative assets (14.4 percent) in Table 2. Table 3 also shows 
that, while the majority of pension assets are invested in equities (56 percent) and alternative 
assets (8 percent), only 28 percent of pension assets are allocated to bonds. This predominant 
allocation of pension assets to equities and alternatives explains the distinct mismatch 
between pension assets and liabilities. As we show in Table 2, both equity returns and returns 
on alternative assets are only weakly correlated with wage changes and long-term bond 
returns. 
Consistent with previous studies of public pension plans, including Pennacchi and 
Rastad (2011) and Mohan and Zhang (2014), we observe a pronounced underfunding of 
pension obligations. On average, only 77 percent of the actuarial pension liabilities are funded 
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by assets. According to Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011), the funding ratio would be even lower 
if pension liabilities were measured by their fair value. 
The typical (median) COB age is 56. The probability that the chairperson is a woman, 
an annuitant, an ex officio trustee, or a beneficiary, is 22, 12, 22, and 71 percent, respectively. 
The probability that he is financially literate is 21 percent. The summary statistics of the 343 
COB changes (Panel C) indicate that the average new COB is 2 years younger than his 
predecessor. In 166 cases, the new COB is younger than the incumbent chairman. In 143 
cases, it is the other way around. The distributions of the first differences in the remaining 
measures of COB risk preferences indicate that these changes are fairly symmetrical. 52 out 
of 100 changes in COB gender are from man to woman, 38 out of 81 changes of the COB’s 
annuitant status are from non-annuitant to annuitant, and 12 out of 28 changes in the 
chairman’s ex officio status are from non-ex officio to ex officio. The distributions of the 
COB control variables are symmetrical as well. 47 out of 98 changes in the beneficiary status 
are from a non-beneficiary to a beneficiary COB. In 56 out of 103 changes in financial 
literacy, the new COB is financially educated while the replaced chairman was not.  
Panel D shows that changes in COB characteristics, except for changes in COB age, are 
not significantly correlated with the decision to replace the COB (New COB). However, 
changes in COB characteristics are correlated with each other. Older COBs are more likely 
annuitants and beneficiaries but less likely financially educated. Female COBs are less likely 
financially literate than men, which is consistent with the findings in Dwyer, Gilkeson, and 
List (2002) and Jörg (2005). Female chairpersons are however more likely annuitants, who 
are in turn less likely ex officio trustees, more likely beneficiaries, and less likely financially 
educated. Finally, ex officio trustees are more likely financially literate. 
 
[insert Table 3 here] 
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6.2. Main results 
Table 4 studies the relation between COB risk preferences and the risk of public pension 
plans. We run FD regressions based on equation (6). Since we make directional predictions on 
the relation between pension risk and our measures of COB risk preferences, we determine 
the statistical significance of the respective coefficients based on one-tailed tests. In contrast, 
the statistical significance of the coefficients on the control variables is determined with a 
two-tailed test. T-statistics are provided in parentheses. We use robust standard errors 
clustered at the pension board level. 
Column (1) displays the results of an FD regression of nominal pension risk on COB 
risk preferences and controls. Column (2) shows the estimates of a similar regression of 
COLA adjusted pension risk. In both regressions, the coefficients on ∆ COB age and 
∆ COB female are negative, while the coefficients on ∆ COB annuitant and ∆ COB ex officio 
are positive. This is in line with our predictions that pension risk is decreasing in COB age, 
lower if the COB is a woman, higher if the COB is an annuitant, and higher if the COB is an 
ex officio trustee. With the sole exception of the coefficient on ∆ COB ex officio in Column 
(2), all coefficients are statistically significant.  
The change of the COB per se (New COB) has no impact on public pension risk. The 
COB’s beneficiary status has no significant effect on pension risk as well, which supports our 
expectation that the pension risk preferences of active beneficiaries are ambiguous. The 
financial literacy of the COB has no significant impact on pension risk either.
28
 We explain 
this result by the fact that pension COBs have easy access to advice from investment 
professionals. Most public pension plans employ a professional investment consultant (Goyal 
and Wahal (2008)). Gaudecker (2015) shows that financial literacy only matters in investment 
decisions by individuals who do not seek outside advice. 
                                                 
28
 In a not tabulated regression, where we extend our definition of financial literacy to bachelor degrees in 
finance, economics, and business administration, we receive a similar result. 
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Furthermore, we find that the change in pension risk is significantly positively related to 
both the lagged change in pension funding ratio and the lagged change in investment return. 
This supports the risk-management view of Rauh (2009) that pension risk is positively related 
to the risk carrying capacity of the plans. It also supports Weller and Wenger (2009) who 
show that managers of underfunded pension plans do not systematically chase returns. 
Moreover, public pension risk is significantly positively related to pension plan size. This is in 
line with Mohan and Zhang (2014), who argue that larger pension plans have higher pension 
risk as they benefit from economies of scale for transaction fees, which increases their 
incentive to invest in equities and alternative assets. 
The impact of COB risk preferences on pension risk is also of economic importance.  
Based on the coefficients in Column (1), we find that a one standard deviation increase in 
COB age (13 years) results in a reduction of pension risk by 1.42 percent, which equals 0.12 
standard deviations of pension risk. A change in COB gender results in a 0.08 standard 
deviation change of pension risk, a change in the COB’s annuitant status explains 0.15 
standard deviations of pension risk, and a change in the COB’s ex officio status leads to a 
change in pension risk by 0.16 standard deviations. In comparison, a one standard deviation 
change in funding status explains a 0.20 standard deviation change in pension risk. The 
replacement of an old, female, non-ex officio COB by a young, male, ex officio trustee causes 
an increase in pension risk by 4.31 percent (0.36 standard deviations of pension risk). To put 
this in perspective, in case of California, this would result in an increase of the one year 97.5 
percent value at risk of public pension plans by USD 8.5 billion or 7.2 percent of the annual 
Californian tax revenue.
29
  
 
[insert Table 4 here] 
                                                 
29
 In 2009, the State of California faced a fair value of pension liabilities of USD 700 billion and achieved 
annual tax revenues of USD 117 billion (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011). 
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6.3. Representativeness 
The median COB turnover in our sample is 3 years. However, there are considerable 
differences between boards. While in some plans, the chairman changes every year, he only 
changes once during our observation period in other plans. Plans with high COB turnover 
hence appear more often in the treatment group than plans where the COB turnover is low. If 
the treatment group is repeatedly composed of the same, small number of pension plans, our 
findings could thus be non-representative for U.S. public pension plans in general. 
We address this concern in Table 5 by repeating the regressions in the previous section 
for a restricted sample of pension board-years where the replaced COB served a minimum 
term of two years (Columns (1) and (2)). This insures that our analysis is not dominated by 
plans with extremely high COB turnover. Consistent with the results in Table 4, we find that 
the coefficients on the COB risk preference measures support our predictions. The estimates 
on COB age and COB gender remain statistically significant. The coefficient on the COB’s ex 
officio status, which is not statistically significant in the COLA adjusted pension risk 
regressions in Table 4, is now significantly larger than zero for both pension risk measures. 
The coefficient on changes in the COB’s annuitant status is however not statistically 
significant anymore. In Columns (3) and (4), we further restrict our sample to board-years 
where the replaced COB served a minimum term of three years. With the sole exception of 
the coefficient on the COB’s ex officio status, which loses its statistical significance in the 
nominal pension risk regression in Column (3), the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the estimates remain virtually unchanged. 
Based on these results, we conclude that our findings in the previous section are 
representative for public pension plans at large. 
 
[insert Table 5 here] 
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6.4. Causality 
The main concern regarding our interpretation that personal COB risk preferences affect 
pension risk is that the relation between pension risk and COB risk preferences could reflect 
the risk preferences of the board of trustees, which usually appoints the COB and formally 
decides on the risk of the pension plan. Potentially, the board simultaneously changes the risk 
of the plan and appoints a new COB whose preferences match the new risk policy. Table 6 
addresses this concern. 
In Columns (1) and (2), we extend our set of controls by changes in the discount rate of 
pension liabilities (∆ Discount rate), changes in the amortization period for an underfunding 
of pension liabilities (∆ Amortization period), and changes in the smoothing period for the 
recognition of an investment loss (∆ Smoothing period). Mohan and Zhang (2014) show that 
pension risk is increasing in those policy variables. Since changes in risk policies require 
board approval, these policy variables reflect the risk preferences of the board of trustees. If 
these preferences were driving the results, their inclusion should weaken the relation between 
pension risk and our measures of COB risk preferences. Contrary to that, we find that the 
coefficients are virtually identical to the estimates in Table 4. None of the coefficients on the 
policy variables is statistically significant. However, both the estimate on changes in the 
discount rate and the coefficient on changes in the amortization period are positive, which 
supports the findings in Mohan and Zhang (2014). 
In Columns (3) and (4), we also control for changes in the composition of the board of 
trustees. We conduct this analysis in a subsample of state-wide pension plans for which we 
have information about changes in the fraction of board seats held by women 
(∆ Female seats), annuitants (∆ Annuitant seats), ex officio trustees (∆ Ex officio seats), 
and beneficiaries (∆ Beneficiary seats), respectively.30 We cannot control for changes in 
                                                 
30
 We like to thank Caroline Ruprecht from the University of Bern for her help in collecting these data. 
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average board member age because we often lack this information. Consistent with our 
argumentation about the preferences of individual COBs in Section 3, we expect that boards 
with a higher percentage of female board members are more risk averse, while boards with a 
higher percentage of annuitant and/or ex officio trustees prefer higher levels of pension risk. 
We control for the fraction of beneficiary board seats because Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) 
find that pension risk increases with the ratio of beneficiary trustees to total board members. 
In this subsample of state-wide plans, we can also control for changes in the S&P state credit 
rating (∆ S&P rating), which is a measure of fiscal constraints of the sponsoring state 
government (Mohan and Zhang (2014)). According to Mohan and Zhang (2014), government 
sponsors that experience tight fiscal constraints have an incentive to increase the risk of 
pension assets. Following GASB standards, increasing the risk of pension assets allows 
sponsors to justify a higher liability discount rate. Higher discounting reduces the actuarial 
value of pension liabilities, improves the funding status, and reduces the annual required 
contribution. Higher pension risk hence allows government sponsors to substitute general 
obligation debt for pension debt. We measure ∆ S&P rating by the number of notches the 
current year rating is higher (positive values) or lower (negative values) than the previous 
year rating.  
We find that sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the coefficients on our 
measures of COB risk preferences are almost identical to the estimates in Columns (1) and 
(2). None of the board composition measures is significantly related to nominal pension risk. 
In the regression of COLA adjusted pension risk, we find that the fraction of annuitant 
trustees is significantly negatively related to pension risk. We interpret this result as the 
reflection of a higher risk aversion of older pension boards. Consistent with the explanation 
that fiscally constrained pension sponsors substitute general obligation debt for pension debt, 
104 
 
we find a negative relation between S&P rating and pension risk. However, the coefficient on 
rating changes is only statistically significant in Column (4). 
 
[insert Table 6 here] 
 
To further mitigate the concern that the relation between pension risk and COB 
preferences reflects the risk preferences of the board of trustees, we consider a subsample of 
pension plans with ex officio COB. Ex officio chairmen hold their position because they are 
elected to a specific public office (e.g., governor, mayor, or superintendent of the school 
district). The pension board has no say in their appointment. Therefore, changes in ex officio 
COB risk preference cannot be a reflection of changes in the risk preference of the board. 
Since ex officio chairpersons are never annuitants but always ex officio trustees, our set of 
risk preference measures is reduced to COB age and gender. Similarly, we do not control for 
the COB’s beneficiary status because in this subsample there is no within-board variation in 
this variable. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 report the estimates from regressions of nominal 
pension risk and COLA adjusted pension risk, respectively. In line with our previous results, 
we find that pension risk decreases with COB age and is lower if the COB is a woman. Both 
effects are statistically significant above the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficients 
suggests that the reflection of COB preferences in pension risk is more pronounced for plans 
where the COB holds his position ex officio than for the average plan in our sample. A one 
standard deviation increase in COB age (8.5 years) causes a reduction in pension risk by 3.5 
percent (0.30 standard deviations) and the replacement of a male COB by a female 
chairperson reduces pension risk by 6.8 percent (0.58 standard deviations). These values are 
more than twice the magnitude of the economic effects of COB age and gender in our main 
analysis (Table 4). We explain these differences by the fact that in one third of the 
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observations in the ex officio sample, the COB serves as a sole trustee. The personal influence 
of sole trustees is likely higher than the influence of chairpersons of large pension boards 
because sole trustees do not need their fellow board members to support their decisions. In 
Columns (3) and (4), we test this explanation by repeating our regressions for the subsample 
of plans where the COB is the sole trustee. In this sample, we find an even stronger economic 
effect of COB risk preferences, which supports our contention that the magnitude of the 
relation between pension risk and COB risk preferences depends on the personal influence of 
the COB. A one standard deviation increase in COB age (8.3 years) reduces pension risk by 
0.66 standard deviations and a switch from male to female COB reduces the pension risk by 
0.87 standard deviations. 
 
[insert Table 7 here] 
 
The results from Tables 7 and 8 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that COBs are 
selected to match the board of trustees’ risk preferences. Moreover, our findings suggest that 
individual COB risk preferences have a more pronounced effect on public pension risk when 
the COB has a higher influence on asset liability matching decisions. The next section 
elaborates further on how our results are affected by the governance structure of the pension 
plan. 
 
6.5. Impact of pension governance 
Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) show that CEOs primarily imprint their 
personal preferences on the managed firm when corporate governance is weak. In this section, 
we inquire into whether good pension governance keeps COBs from imprinting their personal 
preferences on the plans they are responsible for as well. Table 8 compares the impact of 
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COB risk preferences on pension risk between plans with a single board of trustees and plans 
with an (investment) board of trustees that is complemented by a separate pension 
administration board. In the first governance model, all decision power lies with the same 
board. In the second governance model, asset-liability matching decisions lie with the 
investment board, which, however, has to coordinate its decisions with the pension 
administration board (Miller and Funston (2014)). The administration board hence serves as 
an implicit supervisory unit for pension risk decisions of the investment board. Moreover, the 
administration board is responsible for decisions on pension benefit levels. Plans with two 
separate boards are also larger and more professionalized (Miller and Funston (2014)). Thus, 
we consider plans with a separate investment board as better governed. Consistent with 
Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012), we expect the risk of these plans to be less affected 
by personal preferences of the chairman (of the investment board). 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show the estimates for a sample of pension plans with a 
single board of trustees. In both regressions, all coefficients on the COB risk preference 
measures are statistically significant and consistent with our empirical predictions. Columns 
(3) and (4) show the results for plans with a separate investment board. In the regression of 
nominal pension risk, none of the COB risk preference measures is significantly related to 
pension risk. In the regression of COLA adjusted pension risk, the coefficient on the COB’s 
annuitant status is significantly positive and the estimate on the COB’s ex officio status is 
significantly negative. All other coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  
Overall, we interpret these results as supporting evidence for the view that pension risk 
is predominantly affected by COB preferences when pension governance is weaker. 
 
[insert Table 8 here] 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper studies whether the overall risk of public pension plans is affected by the 
personal risk preferences of the chairman of the board of trustees. In line with Pennacchi and 
Rastad (2011), we define pension risk by the volatility of the difference between pension asset 
and pension liability returns. Our empirical analyses of the relation between pension risk and 
COB risk preferences are based on four empirical predictions that have been suggested by the 
literature. Pension risk is (1) negatively affected by an increase in COB age, (2) lower if the 
COB is a woman, (3) higher if the COB is an annuitant, and (4) higher if the COB is a 
politician (ex officio trustee).  
The evidence we present in this paper supports these predictions. Moreover, we cannot 
find that the relation between pension risk and COB risk preferences is explained by an 
endogenous appointment of COBs to plans that match their personal preferences. Similarly, 
our results are not explained by the risk preferences of the board of trustees. The impact of 
COB preferences on pension risk is economically important. Each of our risk preference 
measures explains a considerable amount of the variation in pension risk. Consistent with 
previous results on the impact of individual manager preferences on corporate risk taking, we 
find that the reflection of COB preferences in pension risk is particularly evident among more 
weakly governed plans, which are plans not governed by a separate and professionalized 
investment board. 
Our main contribution is the identification of personal COB risk preferences as a 
predictor of the risk from mismatched pension assets and liabilities. Since current funding 
problems of state and local government pension plans are mainly the consequence of asset 
and liability mismatching, it is in the interest of taxpayers to be wary of who is in charge of 
the asset-liability risk decisions in public pension plans.  
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Appendix: Tables 
Table 1: Probability of COB replacement 
This table compares the probability that the COB is replaced after a year of high investment performance with the probability 
of a COB replacement after a year of low investment performance.  An observation is classified as high performance when 
the previous year performance is above the median investment performance of public pension plans in that year, and as low 
performance otherwise.  Panel A includes observations from pension plans with old as well as young COBs.  Panel B only 
includes observations where the COB is younger than the median COB (56 years).  Panel C only includes observations where 
the COB is younger than the 25th percentile of the COBs (50 years).  The numbers in parentheses indicate t-statistics of a 
parametric test of mean difference. 
Probability of COB replacement 
 After a year of high performance After a year of low performance Difference 
    
Panel A: All observations 0.327 0.316 0.012  (0.42) 
     
Panel B: COB age < 56 years 0.313 0.308 0.005 (0.13) 
     
Panel C: COB age < 50 years 0.314 0.307 0.008 (0.14) 
 
 
Table 2: Correlations and standard deviations of asset returns and wage growth 
This table shows the correlations statistics and the standard deviations of the return series used to estimate the risk of public 
pension plans.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  (1) Equity returns are composed of two thirds the returns of the Vanguard 
Total Stock Market Index Fund (Institutional share class) and one third the returns of the Vanguard Total International Stock 
Index Fund (Investor share class).  (2) Bond returns are composed of nine tenth the returns of the Merrill Lynch U.S. 
Corporate & Government Master Index and one tenth the returns of the Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market ex US Dollar 
Index.  (3) Real estate returns are the returns of the Vanguard REIT Index Fund (Investor share class).  (4) Short term returns 
are the returns of the Vanguard Short-Term Investment-Grade Fund (Institutional share class).  (5) The returns of alternative 
investments are the equally weighted average returns of the Thomson Reuters Core Commodity CRB Total Return Index, the 
Thomson Reuters Private Equity Buyout Research Index, and the Thomson Reuters Venture Capital Research Index.  (6) The 
Nominal 15 year zero bond returns are monthly holding period returns extracted from the yields to maturity of a 15 year zero 
government bond in Thomson Reuters Eikon (USGOV15YZ).  (7) The real 15 year zero bond returns are monthly holding 
period returns extracted from the yield to maturity of the 15 year zero coupon TIPS reported by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright 
(2008).  (8) The wage growth is estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics quarterly seasonal adjusted Employment Cost 
Index for State and Local Government Workers. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Equities 1.000        
(2) Bonds -0.082 1.000       
(3) Real Estate 0.700 0.111 1.000      
(4) Short term -0.147 0.055 -0.092 1.000     
(5) Alternatives 0.946 -0.405 0.640 -0.222 1.000    
(6) Nominal 15 year zero bond -0.266 0.883 -0.084 0.019 0.128 1.000   
(7) Real 15 year zero bond 0.008 0.804 0.138 0.010 -0.172 0.731 1.000  
(8) Wages -0.292 0.110 -0.171 0.809 -0.272 -0.083 0.023 1.000 
Standard deviation 0.109 0.041 0.233 0.005 0.144 0.151 0.107 0.060 
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Table 3: Descriptive sample statistics 
This table shows the descriptive sample statistics of our main variables and further pension plan characteristics.  Variable 
definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  The sample is restricted to pension plans where the board of 
trustees is fully responsible for asset allocation decisions.  Panel A displays the summary statistic of selected pension plan 
and COB characteristics, Panel B provides the summary statistics of the continuous pension variables, Panel C depicts 
descriptive statistics of the changes in COB characteristics for board-years where the COB changes, and Panel D shows the 
pairwise Pearson correlations between changes in COB characteristics.  The asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 
10% level using a two-tailed test.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled 
sample distribution. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of plan and COB characteristics 
Year Mean Median Min Max Std. N 
Nominal PR (in %) 14.31 14.30 10.62 18.83 1.69 1,159 
COLA adj PR (in %) 13.38 13.28 8.79 18.34 2.08 1,159 
       
Alloc. to equities (in %) 56.02 57.27 24.32 73.27 9.58 1,159 
Alloc. to bonds (in %) 28.32 27.73 13.22 53.58 7.51 1,159 
Alloc. to real estate (in %) 5.37 5.28 0.00 17.87 4.33 1,159 
Alloc. to short term securities (in %) 2.10 1.23 0.00 13.69 2.51 1,159 
Alloc. to alternatives (in %) 7.98 5.49 0.00 38.43 8.51 1,159 
Funding ratio 0.768 0.768 0.376 1.275 0.184 1,159 
Market value of assets (in $m) 22,346 10,401 798 163,438 30,105 1,159 
       
COB age (in years) 57 56 37 82 10 1,159 
COB female 0.223 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.416 1,159 
COB annuitant 0.119 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.324 1,159 
COB ex officio 0.223 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.417 1,159 
COB beneficiary 0.714 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.452 1,159 
COB financial literacy 0.210 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.407 1,159 
Panel B: Summary statistics of continuous pension variables 
 Mean Median Min Max Std. N 
Δ Nominal PR -0.048 0.208 -4.238 3.513 1.876 1,052 
Δ COLA adj PR -0.074 0.115 -4.206 3.503 1.826 1,052 
Δ Funding ratio -0.018 0.009 -0.324 0.140 0.097 1,052 
Δ Return 0.015 0.017 -0.360 0.486 0.170 1,052 
Δ Ln size 0.035 0.073 -0.356 0.236 0.126 1,052 
Panel C: Summary statistics of changes in COB characteristics provided a change of the COB 
 Mean Std. N  N (nonzero) N (positive) N (negative) 
New COB 1.000 0.000 343 343 343 0 
Δ COB age (in years) -1.818 13.077 331 309 143 166 
Δ COB female 0.012 0.541 343 100 52 48 
Δ COB annuitant -0.015 0.486 343 81 38 43 
Δ COB ex officio -0.012 0.286 343 28 12 16 
Δ COB beneficiary -0.012 0.535 343 98 47 51 
Δ COB financial literacy 0.026 0.548 343 103 56 47 
Panel D: Correlations between changes in COB characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) New COB 1.000       
(2) Δ COB age (in years) -0.114* 1.000      
(3) Δ COB female 0.018 0.014 1.000     
(4) Δ COB annuitant -0.025 0.511* 0.067* 1.000    
(5) Δ COB ex officio -0.034 -0.028 -0.019 -0.169* 1.000   
(6) Δ COB beneficiary -0.018 0.144* -0.010 0.292* 0.000 1.000  
(7) Δ COB financial literacy 0.039 -0.107* -0.089* -0.120* 0.150* -0.119* 1.000 
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Table 4: COB characteristics and pension risk 
This table shows the results of our main first difference regressions of pension risk on the risk preferences of the COB and 
controls.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  The sample is restricted to pension plans where 
the board of trustees is fully responsible for asset allocation decisions.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged periods.  
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using one-tailed tests with respect to the 
COB risk preference measures and two-tailed tests in case of all other variables.  T-statistics are provided in parentheses.  
Standard errors are clustered at the pension board level.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th 
percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
Dependent variable   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)  
 (1) (2) 
   
New COB -0.057 -0.046 
 (-0.856) (-0.614) 
Δ COB age -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (-2.915) (-2.597) 
Δ COB female -0.137* -0.192** 
 (-1.434) (-1.781) 
Δ COB annuitant 0.251** 0.347*** 
 (1.827) (2.505) 
Δ COB ex officio 0.277** 0.271 
 (1.752) (0.956) 
Δ COB beneficiary -0.008 -0.056 
 (-0.078) (-0.477) 
Δ COB financial literacy -0.157 -0.138 
 (-1.395) (-1.170) 
Δ Funding ratio-1 3.362*** 2.006** 
 (3.981) (2.528) 
Δ Return-1 1.313*** 0.889** 
 (3.718) (2.511) 
Δ Ln size 4.206*** 4.868*** 
 (9.992) (10.662) 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Observations 935 935 
COB changes 302 302 
R2 adjusted 0.761 0.693 
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Table 5: Representativeness 
This table shows the results of first difference regressions of pension risk on the risk preferences of the COB and controls for 
a subsample of board-years where the COB does not change or the replaced COB served a minimum term of two and three 
years, respectively.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  The sample is restricted to pension 
plans where the board of trustees is fully responsible for asset allocation decisions.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged 
periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using one-tailed tests with 
respect to the COB risk preference measures and two-tailed tests in case of all other variables.  T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the pension board level.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
Sample   
In case the COB changes, the predecessor served a 
minimum term of 2 years 
  
In case the COB changes, the predecessor served a 
minimum term of 3 years 
Dependent variable   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
New COB -0.036 -0.027 -0.093 -0.066 
 (-0.418) (-0.282) (-0.807) (-0.530) 
Δ COB age -0.013** -0.014** -0.018** -0.014* 
 (-1.979) (-1.820) (-2.170) (-1.382) 
Δ COB female -0.236** -0.262** -0.387*** -0.301** 
 (-2.203) (-2.007) (-3.485) (-2.293) 
Δ COB annuitant 0.106 0.151 0.171 0.080 
 (0.601) (0.827) (0.667) (0.313) 
Δ COB ex officio 0.320** 0.311** 0.208 0.256* 
 (2.103) (1.691) (1.262) (1.490) 
Δ COB beneficiary 0.037 -0.038 0.003 -0.077 
 (0.226) (-0.208) (0.014) (-0.338) 
Δ COB financial literacy -0.258 -0.254 -0.166 -0.246 
 (-1.479) (-1.492) (-0.936) (-1.333) 
Δ Funding ratio-1 3.515*** 2.190** 3.540*** 2.323** 
 (3.716) (2.475) (3.480) (2.440) 
Δ Return-1 1.285*** 0.819** 1.344*** 0.954** 
 (3.275) (2.096) (3.117) (2.224) 
Δ Ln size 4.318*** 5.003*** 4.067*** 4.783*** 
 (8.764) (8.993) (7.472) (7.658) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 820 820 748 748 
COB changes 187 187 115 115 
R2 adjusted 0.753 0.683 0.757 0.685 
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Table 6: Simultaneity to changes in pension policies and changes in the board composition 
This table shows the results of our tests for the endogeneity of our findings to changes in pension policies or changes in the 
composition of the board of trustees.  Variable definitions are in Table 9.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  The initial sample 
is restricted to pension plans where the board of trustees is fully responsible for asset allocation decisions.  Subscripts 
indicate the number of lagged periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level 
using one-tailed tests with respect to the COB risk preference measures and two-tailed tests in case of all other variables.  T-
statistics are provided in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the pension board level.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
Sample   Entire sample   State pension plans only  
Dependent variable   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     New COB -0.061 -0.048 -0.089 -0.050 
 (-0.906) (-0.640) (-0.990) (-0.492) 
Δ COB age -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.019** -0.016** 
 (-2.923) (-2.605) (-2.208) (-1.692) 
Δ COB female -0.136* -0.192** -0.163* -0.223** 
 (-1.418) (-1.773) (-1.337) (-1.797) 
Δ COB annuitant 0.254** 0.351*** 0.260* 0.319** 
 (1.845) (2.536) (1.359) (1.700) 
Δ COB ex officio 0.295** 0.290 0.300* 0.161 
 (1.766) (1.002) (1.395) (0.498) 
Δ COB beneficiary -0.005 -0.054 -0.047 -0.078 
 (-0.052) (-0.463) (-0.365) (-0.521) 
Δ COB financial literacy -0.160 -0.141 -0.079 -0.075 
 (-1.403) (-1.180) (-0.579) (-0.534) 
Δ Female seats   -0.117 -0.177 
   (-0.236) (-0.326) 
Δ Annuitant seats   -1.052 -2.150* 
   (-0.972) (-1.924) 
Δ Beneficiary seats   -2.160 -1.767 
   (-1.210) (-0.967) 
Δ Ex officio seats   -1.684 -2.730 
   (-0.564) (-0.850) 
Δ Discount rate 25.570 27.443 13.374 13.560 
 (0.985) (1.075) (0.396) (0.413) 
Δ Amortization period 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.009 
 (0.403) (0.334) (1.025) (0.993) 
Δ Smoothing period -0.007 0.021 0.028 0.023 
 (-0.169) (0.491) (0.639) (0.523) 
Δ Funding ratio-1 3.355*** 2.020** 3.167*** 1.591* 
 (3.925) (2.502) (3.016) (1.714) 
Δ Return-1 1.313*** 0.889** 1.422*** 0.971** 
 (3.674) (2.473) (3.231) (2.209) 
Δ Ln size 4.219*** 4.898*** 4.317*** 5.124*** 
 (9.947) (10.591) (7.563) (8.223) 
Δ S&P Rating   -0.017 -0.026** 
   (-1.438) (-2.336) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 935 935 629 629 
COB changes 302 302 190 190 
R2 adjusted 0.761 0.692 0.773 0.699 
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Table 7: Ex officio appointment of the COB 
This table shows the results of our test for a deliberate selection of COBs by the board of trustees.  Variable definitions are in 
Table 9.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  The initial sample is restricted to pension plans where the board of trustees is fully 
responsible for asset allocation decisions and the COB is appointed ex officio.  Subscripts indicate the number of lagged 
periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using one-tailed tests with 
respect to the COB risk preference measures and two-tailed tests in case of all other variables.  T-statistics are provided in 
parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the pension board level.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
Sample   Plans with ex officio COB  
 
Plans where the COB is the sole trustee 
 
Dependent variable   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
New COB -0.306** -0.256 -0.290 -0.261 
 (-2.048) (-1.472) (-0.651) (-0.486) 
Δ COB age -0.059** -0.058** -0.129*** -0.135*** 
 (-1.858) (-1.736) (-4.239) (-4.188) 
Δ COB female -0.965*** -0.957** -1.415** -1.054* 
 (-2.451) (-2.002) (-2.069) (-1.619) 
Δ COB financial literacy 0.162 0.220 0.434* 0.492 
 (0.604) (0.698) (1.654) (1.320) 
Δ Funding ratio-1 4.067** 2.768** 5.532 2.075 
 (2.523) (2.048) (1.380) (0.576) 
Δ Return-1 1.204** 0.187 1.459 0.501 
 (1.994) (0.274) (1.046) (0.388) 
Δ Ln size 3.579** 4.949** 6.088*** 8.863*** 
 (2.431) (2.226) (3.467) (4.386) 
   
  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 176 176 62 62 
COB changes 29 29 11 11 
R2 adjusted 0.833 0.736 0.737 0.631 
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Table 8: Impact of pension governance 
This table displays the results of first difference regressions of pension risk on measures of COB risk preferences and 
controls separately for pension plans that are governed by a single board of trustees and plans that are governed by two 
separate boards – one for investment and one for pension administration decisions.  The initial sample is restricted to pension 
plans where the (investment) board of trustees is fully responsible for asset allocation decisions.  The COB variables refer to 
the chairperson of the board that decides on asset-liability matching.  The data refer to 2001 to 2013.  Subscripts indicate the 
number of lagged periods.  Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level using one-
tailed tests with respect to the COB risk preference measures and two-tailed tests in case of all other variables.  T-statistics 
are provided in parentheses.  Standard errors are clustered at the pension board level.  All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and the 99th percentile of their pooled sample distribution. 
Sample   Single board of trustees   Separate pension administration board 
Dependent variable   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %)   Δ Nominal PR (in %)   Δ COLA adj PR (in %) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
New COB -0.071 -0.049 0.180 0.218 
 (-0.981) (-0.605) (1.104) (1.085) 
Δ COB age -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.001 0.005 
 (-2.834) (-2.653) (-0.097) (0.405) 
Δ COB female -0.152* -0.237*** 0.136 0.190 
 (-1.505) (-2.344) (0.499) (0.533) 
Δ COB annuitant 0.274** 0.338** 0.068 0.427* 
 (1.839) (2.278) (0.251) (1.473) 
Δ COB ex officio 0.343** 0.482** -0.222 -0.827** 
 (1.928) (1.776) (-1.125) (-2.216) 
Δ COB beneficiary -0.014 -0.052 -0.291*** -0.556*** 
 (-0.131) (-0.402) (-2.816) (-3.991) 
Δ COB financial literacy -0.133 -0.106 -0.315* -0.527** 
 (-1.011) (-0.807) (-1.767) (-2.490) 
Δ Funding ratio-1 3.055*** 1.675* 3.978** 4.125** 
 (3.120) (1.845) (2.202) (2.295) 
Δ Return-1 1.497*** 1.020** -0.292 0.331 
 (3.627) (2.492) (-0.986) (1.316) 
Δ Ln size 4.173*** 4.978*** 3.959*** 3.437*** 
 (8.969) (9.935) (9.181) (4.466) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 839 839 96 96 
COB changes 272 272 30 30 
R2 adjusted 0.755 0.692 0.816 0.723 
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Table 9: Variable definitions 
This table summarizes the variable definitions.  The first column provides the variable names, the second column displays the 
definitions, and the third column shows the source of the data. 
Variable Definition Data source 
Δ Nominal PR Year-to-year change in the annualized volatility of the monthly difference between 
pension asset returns and pension liability returns (tracking error). The estimation is 
made according to Pennacchi and Rastad (2011). The expression is in percentage 
points. The interest rate risk of pension liabilities reflects nominal interest rate risk. A 
detailed description is provided in Section 4.2. 
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)31, Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics32 
Δ COLA adj PR Equivalently defined to Δ Nominal PR with the exception that the interest rate risk of 
pension liabilities reflects real interest rate risk for plans that provide CPI related 
Cost of Living Adjustments (COLAs) of their pension benefits. A detailed description 
is provided in Section 4.2. 
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)31, Thomson 
Reuters Eikon, Gürkaynak, Sack, 
and Wright (2008)33, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics32 
New COB Binary variable that takes 1  in the first fiscal year when the new COB presides the 
pension board for at least half of the fiscal year (six month), and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB age Difference in age between the new COB and the predecessor in years. COB age is 
defined as the difference between the current fiscal year and the year of birth of the 
COB. The variable is set to 0 if New COB is 0. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB female Difference in gender between the new COB and the predecessor. The variable 
takes a value of 1 if the COB changes from a man to a woman, -1 if the COB 
changes from a woman to a man, and zero otherwise. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB annuitant Difference in the annuitant status between the new COB and the predecessor. The 
variable takes a value of 1 if the COB changes from a non-annuitant trustee to an 
annuitant trustee, -1 if the COB changes from an annuitant trustee to a non-
annuitant trustee, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB ex officio Difference in the ex officio status between the new COB and the predecessor. The 
variable takes a value of 1 if the COB changes from a non-ex officio trustee to an ex 
officio trustee, -1 if the COB changes from an ex office trustee to a non-ex officio 
trustee, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB beneficiary Difference in the beneficiary status between the new COB and the predecessor. 
The variable takes a value of 1 if the COB changes from a non-beneficiary to a 
beneficiary of the plan, -1 if the COB changes from a beneficiary to a non-
beneficiary, and 0 otherwise. 
Hand collected 
Δ COB financial literacy Difference in the financial literacy between the new COB and the predecessor. The 
variable takes a value of 1 if the COB changes from a not financially literate person 
to a financially literate person, -1 if the COB changes from a financially literate 
person to a financially not literate person, and 0 otherwise. A COB is considered 
financially literate when he holds a Master’s and/or a PhD degree in economics, 
finance, or business administration, or when he is a Chartered Financial Analyst 
(CFA), a Certified Financial Planner (CFP), a Certified Public Accountant, or a 
Certified Public Financial Advisor (CPFA). 
For 21 COBs in our sample, we could not find an indication about their education. 
We assume that those COBs do not fulfill our criteria of financial literacy. 
Hand collected 
Δ Female seats Year-to-year change in the ratio of female board members to total board members. Hand collected 
Δ Annuitant seats Year-to-year change in the ratio of annuitant board members to total board 
members. 
Hand collected 
Δ Beneficiary seats Year-to-year change in the ratio of beneficiary board members to total board 
members. 
Hand collected 
  (continued on next page) 
  
                                                 
31
 The data are available at: http://publicplansdata.org/public-plans-database/download-full-data-set/ 
32
 The data are available at: http://www.bls.gov/data/#wages 
33
 The data are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2008/index.htm 
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Table 9 (continued)   
Variable Definition Data source 
Δ Ex officio seats Year-to-year change in the ratio of ex officio board members to total board 
members. 
Hand collected 
Δ Funding ratio Year-to-year change in the funding ratio. Funding ratio is defined as the market 
value of pension assets divided by the actuarial value of pension liabilities following 
GASB. 
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34 
Δ Return Year-to-year change in the one year investment return. Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34 
Δ Ln size Year-to-year change in the natural logarithm of the market value of assets. Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34  
Δ S&P rating Year-to-year change in the S&P credit rating of the state the pension plan is 
incorporated in. The change is measured by the number of notches the current year 
rating is higher (positive values) or lower (negative values) than the previous year 
rating. 
The Pew Charitable Trusts35 and 
Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
of the District of Columbia36 
Δ Discount rate Year-to-year change in the expected rate of return on pension plan assets, which is 
equivalent to the discount rate on pension benefits (GASB 25). If the discount rate 
is reported missing, we assume no change in the discount rate (24 observations).  
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34  
Δ Amortization period Year-to-year change in the number of years the plan is allowed to take for the 
amortization of an underfunding of pension liabilities. If the amortization period is 
missing, we assume it does not change (138 observations).  
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34  
Δ Smoothing period Year-to-year change in the smoothing period (in years) for recognizing pension 
investment losses. If the smoothing period is missing, we assume it does not 
change (47 observations).  
Center for Retirement Research at 
Boston College (2015)34 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 The data are available at: http://publicplansdata.org/public-plans-database/download-full-data-set/ 
35
 The data are available at:  
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/06/09/sp-ratings-2014 
36
 The data are available at:  
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/Current%20Historical%20GO-
IT%20Credit%20Ratings_073113.pdf 
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